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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Background on the Rural Road and Bridge Problem 
The rural road system in the United States is massive. 
The rural system, for this research, is defined as those 
roads maintained and controlled by counties or townships. 
Over 2.2 million miles of roads are contained in this system 
and much (particularly in the midwest) is built on a grid 
with parallel roads being one mile apart. 
The Ordinance of 1785 was a major reason for this 
pattern as it established townships and the one-mile survey 
grid which divided the land into 640 acre sections or an area 
of one mile square. As land was parceled and sold, the 
sections were further broken into tracts of land, generally 
no smaller than 40 acres. Then, as roads were being surveyed 
and constructed, the section lines or boundaries between 
tracts became the logical places for the roads which lead to 
the grid pattern of roads found throughout the midwest. With 
a road on each side of the section, access to tracts was 
guaranteed and many times access was available from at least 
two directions. 
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Many of today's local rural roads and bridges were built 
in the late 1800s and early 1900s when overland 
transportation for both passengers and freight was limited to 
horse and wagon or the recently built railroad lines. Farms 
were small (usually only one tract which included the 
farmstead), and the farmers needed road access to homes, 
schools, churches and markets. 
The development of the automobile and truck industries 
during the 1920s and 1930s created the need to* get rural 
America "out of the mud". Roads were surfaced and some 
bridges were replaced to accommodate the six to seven ton 
gross weight trucks of the day. Approximately 70 percent of 
today's rural bridges were built before 1935 and even the 
bridges constructed after 1940 were only designed for 15 ton 
loads.1 
Local rural road and bridge construction and maintenance 
are generally supported from highway use taxes and local 
property taxes with some revenue sharing from the federal 
government. A large percent of county revenues come from 
property taxes. Many Iowa counties are already at the 
maximum level of the local tax levy and can not increase 
property taxes for rural roads without changes in state 
Ipor a more complete discussion please see C. Phillip 
Baumel and Eldo Schornhorst, "Local Rural Roads and Bridges: 
Current and Future Problems and Alternatives," Low Volume 
Roads: Third International Conference. Transportation 
Research Record No. 898 (Washington, D.C.: Transportation 
Research Board, National Academy of Sciences, 1983), 374-378. 
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legislation. Not only is there a constraint on increasing 
property taxes but the property tax base is falling. 
Particularly in the midwest, the value of farmland has 
declined significantly.% 
Even though highway use tax collections have increased 
recently because of large raises in fuel and truck road use 
taxes much of the increased revenue has been kept at the 
state level. This all translates into major constraints on 
additional revenue for rebuilding the local rural road 
system. With the decrease in Federal revenue - sharing in the 
past few years, counties have been using up reserve funds and 
will soon be faced with major deficits unless service is 
decreased. The Iowa Highway Needs Study Report indicates 
that the projected 1982-2001 county road revenue buying power 
would cover only 51 percent of the projected county road and 
bridge needs.^ Counties and townships in other states as 
well as state departments of transportation face similar 
budget problems. 
^Wesley D. Smith, P.E., Hamilton County Engineer, 
Chairman, I.C.E.A. Legislative Committee, "Presentation to 
Transportation Committee, Iowa House of Representatives 72nd 
General Assembly" (Jan. 28, 1987), 1-12. (unpublished 
manuscript) 
^lowa Department of Transportation, "Quadrennial Need 
Study, Report on Highway Roads and Streets for Study Years 
1982 through 2001," Volumes I and II (Ames, Iowa: Iowa 
Department of Transportation, 1983). 
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Precise data on the present condition of the local rural 
road system are not available since no ongoing, coordinated 
data collection system exists. Ample evidence, however, does 
exist to suggest that the system is deteriorating rapidly. 
In a recent Illinois survey, farmers and agribusiness 
representatives rated approximately half of the Illinois 
local rural roads as needing more than regular maintenance; 
over 20 percent of these roads were rated as needing major 
repair.4 Reversal of this deterioration trend will require 
increased tax dollars or some strategy to reduce the system 
size to allow funds for maintaining what remains. Public 
debate about county roads had focused mainly on the 
deteriorating condition of the system. The implicit 
assumption behind much of this debate is that the system size 
should be maintained "as is". Little attention has been 
given to reducing the size of the public rural road network. 
Evidence is needed, using economic criteria, as to 
whether the road system should be reduced in size and if so 
how should the reduction be accomplished. The reduction 
could be accomplished by either abandoning low volume roads, 
returning the little-used road to the ownership of those who 
need it as an access, or a combination of both. The scenario 
which returns roads to individual ownership can be further 
^David L. Chicoine and Norman Walzer, "Illinois Township 
Roads and Bridges: Conditions, Demands and Financing," 
(Urbana, Illinois: Cooperative Extension Service, University 
of Illinois, 1985), No. AE 4596. 
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divided into policies where the private road is not open to 
the public or the road is open to the public.^ 
Problem Statement and Objectives 
As stated previously, evidence is needed as to whether 
the rural road and bridge network can be reduced using 
economic criteria. Given current and past budget reductions, 
downsizing the public system seems to be an efficient 
alternative. Yet the governments and elected officials which 
are providing this public good (e.g., the County Board of 
Supervisors in Iowa) have not pursued reduction strategies on 
any major level as a method for mitigating the present road 
and bridge problem. Have they ignored this strategy because 
it is economically infeasible or are the constraints for 
implementation political? 
Will reducing the size of the system result in a gain in 
efficiency and if so what about welfare implications? The 
main objective of this research is to develop a theoretical 
economic model which examines the welfare implications of 
reducing the road system. The research will then focus on 
whether there is a set of roads which could be abandoned with 
^C. Phillip Baumel, Cathy A. Hamlett, and Gregory R. 
Pautsch, "The Economics of Reducing the County Road System: 
Three Case Studies in Iowa" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Transportation, OST/University Research 
Program, 1986), DOT/OST/P-34/86 - 035, 92-103. 
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a net gain to society. A further research objective is to 
develop a simple model for investigating political 
feasibility of reducing the rural system through a policy of 
turning some roads over to private ownership. 
The specific objectives of the research are as follows: 
1) Develop a theoretical framework for the private 
provision of rural roads. The framework will be the basis 
of a utility maximization model to investigate the welfare 
implications of private road provision. 
2) Investigate, through a benefit-cost analysis, 
abandoning low-traffic rural roads and returning other 
low-traffic roads to private ownership. The analysis 
attempts to locate a set of roads which could be 
abandoned from the public's perspective and result in a 
Pareto improvement. 
3) Discuss relevant issues and formulate a simple model 
which investigates why private provision of roads may 
not be a politically feasible strategy. 
The next chapter presents a summary of previous research 
on reducing the rural road system. Literature on private 
provision of a public good, such as a road, is also reviewed 
7 
as is literature on the political issues surrounding road 
provision decisions. 
Private provision of a rural road is examined in Chapter 
III which presents a theoretical framework for individual 
provision levels using a utility maximization model. The 
option of a road remaining open to the public while being 
privately provided is examined. The model allows 
investigation of whether the individual will choose to leave 
the road open to the public. If the road is provided to the 
public, the individual provisions levels under Nash-Cournot 
behavior are compared to those for a Pareto-optimal 
provision. 
Chapter IV reports the methods and results from a 
benefit-cost analysis of reducing a rural road system in an 
Iowa county. An attempt is made to identify a set of roads 
which can be removed from the public road system with a 
resulting Pareto improvement to society's welfare. The 
investment scenario is a compound strategy of abandoning some 
roads and returning others to private drives. The model for 
the benefit-cost ratio is presented as is a detailed 
description of the data collection process and estimation of 
the ratio. 
Political Issues surrounding the private provision of a 
rural road are discussed in Chapter V. A simple model 
exemplifies why private provision may have been and still be 
politically infeasible due to intense lobbying by the rural 
8 
residents whose road would be affected. The concluding 
chapter, Chapter VI, summarizes the major findings and 
results as well as discusses possibilities for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review for this research can be divided 
into three main categories: 
1) Literature on previous theoretical models with some 
application to the investigation of the provision level 
of and welfare implications for privately provided 
roads. 
2) Literature which investigates the efficient size of 
the rural road network. Past methodology for reducing 
the rural road system is explored. 
3) Previous work on political processes and models 
relevant to the policy decisions of the rural road system. 
The following section will discuss the literature in three 
categories in the order listed above. 
10 
Private Provision Literature 
The literature search for this aspect of the research 
did not uncover any theoretical models developed solely for 
the private supply of rural roads. Rural road transportation 
is clearly a public good® and many theoretical models have 
been developed for the optimal supply of public goods. The 
models range from the very general exposition of public goods 
to applications for specific public goods. The pioneering 
work of Samuelson is the standard for the general model of a 
public good. 
Samuelson formalized previous work by Bowen and Lindahl. 
Any student of public finance is familiar with Samuelson's 
optimization criteria for the supply of a public good--the 
sum of the pertinent marginal rates of substitution between 
the public and private good should be set equal to the ratio 
of marginal costs (or the marginal rate of product 
transformation) for producing the public good and private 
good respectively.7 The Samuelson-type model gives us the 
® Transportation infrastructure as a public good is 
further discussed in a following section of this document. 
^ The original references for this are Paul A. 
Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of 
Economics and Statistics. 36 (Nov, 1954), 387-389 and Paul A. 
Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of A Theory of Public 
Expenditure," Review of Economics and Statistics. 37 (Nov. 
1955), 350-356. 
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conditions for a Pareto-optimal provision of the public good 
but does not discuss the optimal provision level from an 
individual perspective. The individual, optimal provision 
level may or may not be Pareto optimal. 
Private provision of a rural road which is generally 
considered a public good has an interesting aspect of joint 
production. Road Provision is an activity that generates a 
joint product of a private and public nature. Chapter III 
includes a more detailed description of the joint product 
relationship applied to rural roads. Several authors have 
published models which incorporate the joint product into a 
theoretical model. The first such author, Mancur Olson, 
suggested that a link existed between private and public 
characteristics generated by one activity.® 
An interesting article by Mishan clarifies and 
summarizes the optimal conditions applicable to private 
goods, jointly produced private goods, public goods, and 
externalities. He does not, however, specify optimality 
conditions for a jointly produced private and public 
benefit.^ 
®Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1965), 132-135. 
^E. J. Mishan, "The Relationship Between Joint Products, 
Collective Goods, and External Effects," Journal of Political 
Economy. 77, No. 3 (May/June 1969), 329-348. Math 
corrections for Mishan's paper were suggested by J. Hayden 
Boyd in "Joint Products, Collective Goods, and External 
Effects: Comment", Journal of Political Economy. 79, No. 5 
12 
Sandler and Culyer outlined a Joint-product model which 
focused on politically separate jurisdictions. Each 
jurisdiction provided a private good and an activity which 
produced a multijurisdictional public good and a 
multijurisdictional private good. The private good was 
private between both jurisdictions but the activity produced 
a good which was public within the jurisdiction and private 
between jurisdictions and a good which was both public within 
and between jurisdictions. This differs from the rural road 
situation where an individual would be providing a road which 
has a private benefit and a public benefit, rather than a 
jurisdiction which produces an intra-public benefit and an 
inter-private b e n e f i t .  
The joint-product model was further developed in an 
article by Cornes and Sandler in 1984. The individual 
consumer was modeled under conditions where a purchased 
commodity produced joint benefits, one private and one 
public. They found that a jointly-produced private output 
could serve a privatizing role which could mitigate the usual 
suboptimality of Nash behavior. Several suggested 
applications for their model were included--common property 
resources, aggregate savings, and behavior of NATO allies. 
(Sept./Oct. 1971), 1138-1140, 
l^Todd Sandler and A. J. Culyer, "Joint Products and 
Multijurisdictional Spillovers," The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 97, No. 4 (Nov. 1982), 707-716. 
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The NATO application was developed and published in 1984 
by Murdoch and Sandler. They use the model to generate 
demand relationships for military activity and use this 
hypothesis for the basis of an empirical investigation. The 
empirical results which estimated the demand for military 
expenditures for nine NATO nations were found to be 
consistent with the hypothesis generated by the theoretical 
joint-product model.H 
Joint-product models were used by Posnett and Sandler, 
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, and by Steinberg to analyze 
charitable contributions. Posnett and Sandler looked at 
using a private good to finance the public good based on the 
idea that fund-raising charities receive revenue from sources 
other than direct giving and that this is a common fund-
raising technique among successful charities. A proportion 
of the private goods sale revenues are applied to the 
charitable cause. This jointness can be used to explain why 
certain strategies of large fund-raising charities can be so 
successful.12 
^Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, "Easy Riders, Joint 
Production, and Public Goods," The Economic Journal. 94 
(Sept. 1984), 580-598. For the NATO application see James C 
Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Complementarity, Free Riding, and 
the Military Expenditures of NATO Allies," Journal of Public 
Economics. 25 (1984), 83-101. 
12john Posnett and Todd Sandler, "Joint Supply and the 
Finance of Charitable Activity," Public Finance Quarterly. 
14, No. 2 (Apr. 1986), pp. 209-222. 
14 
Bergstrom et al. investigated charities in a 
comprehensive article which covered stability, uniqueness, 
and equilibrium. They also extended previous work by 
incorporating the effect of government supply on private 
donations. They argue that, in equilibrium, the set of 
contributors is a subset of the taxpaying population and the 
extra taxes paid by these contributors is much less than the 
government's charitable contribution. Thus, the crowding out 
effect of government contribution is partial and not a dollar 
for dollar crowding out. Their model showed that in general, 
private contributions will supply less than a Pareto-optimal 
amount of public goods. 
Steinberg also used a joint-product model to investigate 
tax implications on charitable giving.He assumes that 
contributions are motivated by both private and public 
considerations. A utility function is used whose arguments 
are a composite private good, person i's donation, and the 
total level of public good provided by other donors as well 
as the government. He does not, however, specify the 
relationship between the donation and the public good, though 
he considers them to be Hicksian Substitutes. He shows that 
l^Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume, and Hal Varian, 
"On the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public 
Economics. 29 (1986), 25-49. 
^^Richard Steinberg, "Charitable Giving as a Mixed 
Public/Private Good: Implications for Tax Policy," Public 
Finance Quarterly. 14, No. 4 (Oct. 1986), 415-431. 
15 
aggregate donations are smaller than in a pure private good 
model by a factor involving the crowding-out effect. The 
direction and magnitude of the crowding-out are dependent on 
the relative importance of the private/public motivations. 
An interesting and versatile model which can be applied 
to some transportation problems was developed by Berglas and 
Pines. Their model focuses on congestion-prone goods. These 
are goods which are consumed collectively but can be 
susceptible to overcrowding as the number of users increase. 
Many roads, such as urban road systems, interstate highways, 
and state highways are prone to congestion. The local rural 
road system is not nearly as congestion prone as the more 
f r e q u e n t l y  u s e d  h i g h w a y s  a n d  s t r e e t s  w i t h i n  c i t i e s . M o s t  
roads in the local rural system have low traffic volumes. 
Berglas and Pines suggest that neighborhood roads can be 
dealt with in the context of their club model,If the 
rural areas were more populated, a club model would be valid 
for looking at returning roads to private ownership. But the 
following analysis focuses on returning small segments of 
l^Eitan Berglas and David Pines, "Clubs, Local Public 
Goods and Transportation Models," Journal of Public 
Economics. 15 (1981), 141-162. A congestion model applied to 
highways is also discussed in a useful article by Herbert 
Mohring and J, Hayden Boyd, "Analyzing 'Externalities': 
'Direct Interaction' vs 'Asset Utilization' Frameworks," 
Economica. 38, No. 152 (Nov. 1971), 347-361. 
^®A club good is a good for which the optimal size of 
its sharing group is finite and small relative to the 
community size. 
16 
rural roads to individuals where the maximum number of 
providers would probably be three. A simpler model without 
congestion and optimal number of sharers is more useful at 
this point. 
Rural Road Reduction Literature 
Only a small number of studies have attempted to collect 
data and investigate reducing the size of the rural road 
system. In Pennsylvania, the Department of Transportation 
identified an Agricultural Access Network in two counties. 
Roads which were judged to be most important to the rural 
agricultural areas for the transport of agricultural products 
were included in the access network. The nonfarm rural 
resident, however, was not included in this study. 
A circuity-type model was used by Nyamaah and Hitzhusen 
to estimate the rerouting costs to road users of posting or 
closing 15 rural bridges in Ohio. The model showed 
substantial benefits for selected bridge repair or 
replacement. However all types of rural traffic, such as 
^^Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 
"Pennsylvania Agricultural Access Network Pilot Study" 
(Harrisburg; Bureau of Strategic Planning, Sept. 1983) 
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farm equipment travel and school bus trips, were not 
quantified and rerouted after the bridge closing,^® 
Criteria were developed by the Midwest Research 
Institute for evaluating candidates for low volume road 
abandonment. Benefit-cost ratios were estimated for each 
road. The procedure used in the benefit index did not 
Include any monetary measures of the value of an individual 
road to the traveling public, nor did the procedure measure 
the cost to the traveling public due to elimination of a road 
or set of r o a d s .19 
Johnson published a theoretical model for estimating the 
benefits of road improvements. His analysis was conceptual 
and did not estimate any benefits. The discussion did not 
include abandoning a road, but his conceptual model could 
easily be expanded to include such a strategy. The major 
factors for an accurate benefit measurement are identified in 
the model: traffic origins and destinations, volumes of 
traffic, and composition of vehicles.^0 
l®Kofi Nyamaah, and Fred Hitzhusen, "A Circuity Model 
for Rehabilitation/Closure of Rural Bridges," North Central 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 7, No. 2 (July 1985). 
l^Mldwest Research Institute, "Criteria for the 
Evaluation and Disposition of Low-Traffic - Count Secondary 
Roads" (Ames, Iowa: Iowa Highway Commission, Feb. 1969), Iowa 
Highway Research Board Project 3205-P. 
^®Marc A. Johnson, "Benefit Measurement for Rural Road 
Improvement Projects," A 105.25:74, Roads of Rural America. 
Arvin R. Bunker and T. Q. Hutchinson, Ed. (Washington B.C.: 
U.S. Department of Agriculture--Economics, Statistics, and 
Cooperatives Service, 1979), 27-33. 
18 
Several studies, including one by Hartwig and one by 
the Iowa Department of Transportation, have suggested that 
abandoning roads may lead to cost savings greater than 
benefits foregone.No analyses were found which 
quantitatively evaluated the abandonment strategy on all 
traffic types. Including all traffic affected is important 
to accurately estimate the costs to society due to road 
abandonment. 
Politics, Policies, and Public Good Literature 
In the area of specific political models for public 
goods, several publications provided insight. Gordon Tullock 
presents a conceptual framework for the provision of rural 
roads in his discussion of problems with majority voting. (A 
very similar model was also presented in Calculus of Consent 
by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.2%) The township 
21see both William C. Hartwig, "Rural Road - Closure 
Program to Preserve Agricultural Land" (Washington, D.C.: 
Transportation Research Board, National Academy of Sciences, 
1978), Transportation Research Record 687 and Iowa Department 
of Transportation, "A Study to Determine Alternative Primary 
and Secondary Road System Sizes" (Ames, Iowa: Iowa Department 
of Transportation, Jan. 29, 1982). 
^^Gordon Tullock, "Some Problems of Majority Voting," 
Journal of Political Economy. 67, No. 6 (Dec. 1959), 571-579. 
Or see Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of 
Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 135-140. 
19 
provides the maintenance of the rural roads and this must be 
voted upon by the entire township. The repair of each road 
is approved by a simple majority vote. Two scenarios are 
discussed, one with political logrolling and one without. 
Initially, each agent determines his/her average 
standard of maintenance for the set of all roads. The farmer 
or agent then votes for proposals which are consistent with 
his or her standard level of maintenance. This results in a 
solution where the overall maintenance standard tends to be 
the one indicated by the median voter. 
The next scenario, called the maximizer, one of the 
farmers votes to repair his/her own road at any opportunity. 
The maximizing farmer then votes against all proposals to 
repair roads other than his/her own. The result of this 
action shifts the road maintenance standard away from the 
median with the maximizer's road maintained at a higher 
level. 
Logrolling comes into the maximizer scenario by allowing 
more than one farmer to pursue the maximizing behavior. 
(Political logrolling is when voters form coalitions or pacts 
to trade votes.) For example if there are two voters each on 
a different road, logrolling occurs when the two agree that 
each will vote for proposals to upgrade the other's road. 
Advantages exist for the maximizers to form such coalitions. 
The maximizers will now vote for the repair of roads of 
others in the coalition. 
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Tullock looks at a specific example where a total of 100 
farmers exist and 51 are maximizers while 49 are Kantians. 
The result after various "logrolling" type exchanges is that 
each road will be maintained at a higher level and at a 
greater expense than is rational from the standpoint of 
farmers living along the road. This conceptual model is a 
good start in thinking about how the political provision of 
rural roads may be structured. The political institution of 
a County Board of Supervisors or some elected body must be 
introduced to bring the model closer to reality. 
Another article which looks at small group dominance 
from another perspective was published by Sam Peltzman in 
1976. In his work, "Toward a More General Theory of 
Regulation", Peltzman extended work by Stigler^^ and attempts 
to formalize an economic theory which explains the small 
group dominance which is so prevalent in the regulatory 
process.24 
Peltzman's basic assumption is that transfer of wealth 
is the issue in the regulatory process. The transfer is not 
necessarily in cash but more likely to be in the form of a 
regulated price or an entry restriction. The politician or 
Z^George Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. 2 (1971), 
3-21. 
^^Sam Peltzman, "Toward a More General Theory of 
Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics. 19 (Aug. 1976), 
211-248. 
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the regulator is the focal point and the politician maximizes 
a support function, which in turn maximizes majority votes to 
allow for re-election. However a more complex support 
function could be imagined where vote-getting is only a 
partial goal. The voters are divided into two groups, those 
which have direct benefits from the regulation and those 
which do not. 
The support or majority generating function is based on 
a measure of the wealth of the two groups. Obviously interest 
groups have more complex goals than simple wealth 
maximization. (With respect to the road and bridge problem, 
the farmer may well gain utility from having fewer bumps in 
his roads. But the number of bumps has little to do with 
wealth determination.) The resulting regulation is an 
outcome of the balance between these two "pressure groups". 
In his book, Railroads. Freight, and Public Policy. 
Theodore Keeler suggests that Peltzman's model can be used to 
infer that, because benefits of rail service to small 
communities is concentrated among fewer people than are the 
costs of taxing the users of high density rail routes to 
cross - subsidize such service, residents of small communities 
will engage in "boosterism". This will lead the support 
maximizing regulator to provide more low-density service than 
a benefit-cost analysis could justify. Unfortunately, Keeler 
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does not specifically disclose how this conclusion is 
reached.^5 
Gary Becker's article "A Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence" provides another 
economic approach to political behavior. He divides 
individuals into pressure groups defined by occupation, 
industry, income, geography, age, and other characteristics. 
These groups use political influence to promote their well-
being and influence such things as structure of taxes, 
subsidies, and political favors. The political equilibrium 
has the property that all groups maximize their incomes by 
spending an optimal amount on political pressure after taking 
into consideration the productivity of their expenditures and 
the behavior of the other groups. 
The utility of each person is assumed to be measured by 
real full income. The groups then compete for political 
influence by spending time, energy, and money on the 
production of political pressure. The pressure functions 
depend on resources spent per member and the number of people 
in the group. 
Two of the four propositions in Becker's paper are 
somewhat related to this research. The first is that a group 
that becomes more efficient at producing political pressure 
^^Theodore E. Keeler, Railroads. Freight, and Public 
Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 
165-171. 
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would be able to reduce its taxes or raise its subsidy. The 
other is that politically successful groups tend to be small 
relative to the size of the groups taxed to pay their 
subsidies,^ ® 
Kenyon in his article "Preference Revelation and Supply 
Response in the Arena of Local Government" focused on demand 
revealing preferences. Kenyon said that citizens at the 
local level reveal their preferences for public goods by 
participating directly in the decision-making process. 
In his model, citizens can "buy" an increase in the 
probability that their preferred proposal will be accepted by 
participating in a lobbying effort. This includes such 
things as signing a petition, writing a letter, or appearing 
at a public hearing. The decision as to whether or not to 
participate is founded upon the expected utility to be 
gained. 
Two statements regarding optimal lobbying, which are 
directly applicable to this research, are made. The first is 
that a lobbying effort which indicates a positive change in 
utility for society will increase the probability of a given 
proposal passing (the argument is symmetric with respect to 
negative utility changes). The second is that equal but 
Z^Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of Competition Among 
Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics. 98, No. 3 (Aug. 1983), 371-400. 
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opposing lobbying efforts will cancel themselves out and have 
a zero net effect on the probability of passing. 
Kenyon goes on to test his model with empirical work. 
One interesting result was that an individual appearing at a 
public hearing as a representative of a group has 
approximately the same effect on probability of approval as 
do twenty-six individual appearances or seventy petition 
signatures. 
The final publication, "Endogenous Local Public 
Extension Policy," written by Huffman and McNulty uses a 
model of pressure groups to explain the public provision of 
agricultural extension services. The pressure groups are 
divided into those who bear the net costs and those receiving 
net benefits from the publicly provided services. 
Specifically these groups are composed of nonfarm and farm 
individuals respectively. The expenditures directed to 
applying pressure are assumed to be positively related to the 
wealth or income positions of these two groups. They then go 
on to hypothesize an econometric model to test the 
relationship between extension expenditures per county and 
2^0. A. Kenyon, "Preference Revelation and Supply 
Response in the Arena of Local Government," Public Choice. 42 
(1984), 147-160. 
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the wealth of the beneficiaries as measured by several 
variables. 
The next chapter develops a utility maximization model 
for the private provision of a public road. The provisions 
levels under Nash-Cournot behavior are derived and 
comparative static results are investigated. Provision under 
Pareto-optimal criteria is also developed and compared to the 
optimal levels under Nash-Cournot. 
^®Wallace E. Huffman and Mark McNulty, "Endogenous Local 
Public Extension Policy," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 67, No. 4 (Nov. 1985), 761-768. 
26 
CHAPTER III. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter investigates, through a theoretical 
economic model, the implications when part of the road system 
is given to people who have access on the roads and if some 
of these roads remain open to the public. Though present 
laws make this scenario difficult to implement, private 
provision of public roads is a further step which warrants 
analysis. Laws can change and the present legal structure 
should not limit one's thinking. 
A private road for this part of the study will be a road 
maintained or provided for public use by one or more people 
as opposed to being provided by the local government thus 
being part of the public system. The following will analyze 
the concept of a private road and allows the individual to 
choose whether or not the road will remain open to the 
public. 
Private provision of a public road may be a viable 
alternative to the difficulties being faced by local 
governments relative to the road and bridge problem. The 
burden of providing rural roads would be shifted from the 
public to those using the roads. The relevant rural roads 
are not highly-traveled paved or gravel roads which obviously 
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benefit the public, but are those little-used roads whose 
traffic is almost entirely composed of residents having 
access on the road. One possible solution to the budget 
problems being faced by many local governments may be to 
continue providing a core of public roads and let the rural 
residents maintain the remaining road system. 
The remainder of the chapter discusses the county road 
system in the context of being a public good and then 
describes the joint benefit aspect of a privately supplied 
public road. A framework is developed for analyzing this 
problem from an individual agent, rural resident perspective. 
A utility-maximizing model in then built from this framework 
and provisions levels as well as welfare implications are 
investigated. 
The county road system is a public good^^ where public 
goods are distinguished from private goods (in the pure 
Samuelsonian sense) by the nonrival consumption 
characteristic and by infeasibility of excluding nonpayers. 
Nonrival consumption refers to the characteristic where one 
person consuming a unit of the public good does not preclude 
^^Another way to think of the private/public distinction 
is that a private good is where each unit of the private good 
enters into some particular individual's utility function but 
only into one person's function. A unit of the public good 
will enter into multiple utility functions. This has also 
been called a joint distribution constraint where supplying a 
public good to one is not possible without supplying it to 
others. 
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anyone else from also consuming that same unit of the good.^O 
The road system, after construction, fits into this category. 
A rural road is nonrival in consumption, i.e., if A 
drives on the road, this does not prevent B from also driving 
on the road. Given that the road is in a rural area, the 
problem of congestibility does not apply. 
Congestibility refers to the decreased consumption 
opportunities as more people demand the public good, a 
swimming pool is the often-used example. The pool, once 
built, is essentially a public good where one person in the 
pool does not prevent another from also enjoying the pool. 
But if 100 people try to enjoy the pool, the congestion will 
decrease the benefits derived by the swimmers. 
The other dimension usually examined when categorizing a 
good as either public or private is whether nonpayers can be 
effectively excluded from consuming the good. With the rural 
road system, excluding people who paid no taxes would be 
virtually impossible due to the high cost of such exclusion. 
An electronic gate could be constructed at every mile of road 
to collect tolls and the local travelers issued credit cards 
for access but the cost would still be high. 
See R. A. Musgrave and P. B. Musgrave, Public Finance 
in Theory and Practice. 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1984), 48 or Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of 
Externalities. Public Goods, and Club Goods (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 113-116. 
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Efficient resource use, according to standard micro-
economic theory, requires that the equilibrium conditions to 
be satisfied are for the market price to be equated to the 
marginal cost of producing that particular product, but in 
the case of the public good the equilibrium conditions are 
slightly different. These criteria, generally attributed to 
Samuelson's work, were described in the literature review 
chapter. 
The following model will take into account the 
publicness and describe the equilibrium conditions for 
individual provision of a rural road. The model also is used 
to investigate desired private provision levels using Pareto-
optimal criteria. A Pareto-optimum is a societal equilibrium 
where no one can be made better off without someone else 
being made worse off. Thus a Pareto improvement results in 
at least one person being made better off and no one being 
made worse off. 
An interesting mix of private/public characteristics is 
to be found in the private provision of a road which is used 
by the public. The individual who is providing the private 
road can be gaining private benefits such as increased market 
value of property because of good access, easier travel to 
the field or home on the private road, more convenient mail 
delivery, and other numerous benefits. 
The private road, if open to the public, is also 
contributing a public benefit that is enjoyed by all, 
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including the provider. The private road, open to the 
public, adds to the system effect of the road network and is 
a public good. The system effect is the travel-time 
efficiency gained from having a network of roads. Public 
benefits such as decreased travel time, speedy access for 
emergency vehicles, better postal delivery, shorter school 
bus rides, and other such things which depend on an extensive 
road system are enjoyed by the person providing the road 
along with all other rural residents. 
Model for Private Provision of Roads 
Presented in this section is an impure public goods 
model for private provision of a portion of the rural road 
system with the county providing the remaining core system. 
A Nash-Cournot equilibrium is derived initially and a 
comparative static analysis is conducted. A Nash model 
assumes the economic agents will take the behavior of other 
individuals as constant or exogenous to his or her decision­
making process. The Nash-Cournot solution is followed by a 
solution using Pareto-optimal criteria and a comparison is 
made between the two levels of provision. 
The county or rural area is assumed to contain N agents 
or individuals where the set of N people is partitioned into 
two subsets : 
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1) Set B contains all n people who will have the 
opportunity to provide a positive quantity of private 
road. 
2) is the complement of B and only the (N-n) people who 
will not have the opportunity to provide private roads are 
members. 
These subsets are constructed from a political process. A 
political body makes decisions about whether a road is going 
to remain part of the public system. So if the political 
body decides to remove a road from the public system, the 
people who have access on the road would become part of B. 
The roads that would be part of the private system, 
which is open to the public, are determined in a two-step 
process, the political body decides which roads to remove 
from the public system and the individual having access on a 
road to be removed then decides whether to provide that road 
to the public. The first step is exogenous to the model. 
The model's focus is on the second step, whether someone from 
set B will provide a positive quantity of road and if so, how 
much will they provide. 
Roads are assumed to be measured with a mile-quality 
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indexai, where if is the amount of road being supplied by 
person i and if this is one mile of a gravel surface road, it 
can be compared to person j who is providing one mile of road 
with a dirt surface. In this case, q^ will be larger than 
qJ. If two people live on the same mile of road, q^ and qj 
would be one half mile of road being provided by i and j 
respectively. The structure of the index allows the 
summation of q^ over all ieB with no double - counting or 
overlap. 
The rural system, S, can be divided into two components, 
the part still being provided by the county, or the local 
government, and those roads which are part of the privately-
provided road system. The network of roads being provided by 
the county, referred to as the core or C, would be most of 
the paved roads and heavily traveled gravel roads which link 
destinations of high use. For example, the core would most 
likely link cities, towns, or grain elevators. The private 
system, Q, is an access system to the core and contains 
marginal, low-volume, roads. 
S^One can easily think of an index of the type where one 
mile of paved road is equal 1, one mile of gravel surface is 
equal to some proportion, a, of one mile of paved road, where 
0<a<l. (An example is a-0.5 and is representing 2 miles of 
gravel are equivalent to 1 mile of paved road.) The earth 
surface would be indexed similarly, let one mile of earth 
surface be some proportion, /3, of one mile of paved road, 
where /9<a and 0<fi<l. (e.g. , 5 miles of earth would be 
equivalent to 1 mile of paving or j3-0.2. ) 
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The scenario being considered is obviously a polar case 
where the county provides all of the public system and the 
individuals provide all of the private system. Further work 
could mix the strategies and allow for the private system to 
be partially provided by the public. For example, an 
Interesting case for further work would be where the county 
builds the roads and the individuals maintain them. 
To go from the current rural road system in which most 
all the roads are provided by the local government to the 
scenario being modeled, one can think of the county as 
providing the roads which have high traffic volume and the 
rural residents being given the road which links their home 
or field with the core system. So person i would have the 
road returned to him or her which linked i's home with the 
core or another private road. Person i could then continue 
providing the road at some level or close the road to 
public access, q^-0. 
The road system can be defined in notational form: 
(1) S - Q + C 
Where S is the sum of the index of the core system, C, and 
the private system, Q. 
The utility function of individual i, assumed to be 
strictly increasing in all arguments, smooth, quasi-concave, 
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and twice - continuously differentiable is represented as 
follows : 
(2) ui(yi, Z) ieB 
Where a) y^ is a private good or some bundle of private 
goods. 
b) is the private benefit derived from the road, 
q^. If ieB°, then qi-0 and thus x^-0. 
c) Z is the pure public benefit derived from the 
road system in aggregate (including a positive 
public benefit for those 165^)32 
The following analysis focuses on whether someone from B will 
provide a positive quantity of q and if so, how much q. 
Q, the private part of the road system, can be further 
specified. The sum over all the q's provided by the n rural 
residents in set B will be Q, thus 
(3) 
n 
I 
i-1 
-
Q can also be expressed as follows: 
^^The formulation of the utility function does not have 
a specific term that would capture the benefit individual i 
might experience from a friend traveling on the road system. 
This could be captured with a term such as D^(Q,C) and would 
embody benefits i gains from such activities as visitors 
traveling on the road system. could also be a negative 
benefit, such as might be associated with traveling salesmen 
having better overall access to i's house. 
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(4) Q - Q-i + qi 
Where Q"^ is the sum of the private roads being provided by 
the (n-1) people besides i. To person i, Q"^ is assumed, 
under Nash-Cournot behavior, to be exogenous to the decision­
making process. Equations (3) and (4) are just two different 
expressions for Q, the private system. Q can be expressed as 
the simple sum of all roads provided by individuals or the 
sum of one person's provision and that of everyone else. 
The benefits or characteristics, x^ and Z, found in the 
utility function of person i are joint products produced by 
q^. The transformation functions which relate q^ to x^ and Z 
are assumed to take the following forms: 
(5) x^ - aql ieB 
The coefficient a is assumed to be greater than zero. Thus 
the transformation relating q^ to x^ is positive, direct, and 
in a fixed proportion. A fixed-proportion transformation 
function simplifies the analysis without loss of generality 
in the results. The private benefit, x^, is derived by 
person i, from the provision of q^ in a fixed proportion, a. 
The transformation from q^ to Z is direct and explained in 
two steps, first z^ is produced through a function z^ whose 
arguments are q^, Q'i, and C: 
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(6) zi - zi(qi+Q-i,C) ieB 
If i is a member of , the group of people with no 
opportunity to provide a private road, then q^-0 and 
z^-z^(Q,C). The overall public benefit, Z, is a sura of the 
public benefits gained by all N rural residents. 
n N 
(7) Z - ^ zi(qi+Q-i,C) + ^ zi(Q,C) - Z(qi+Q-i,C) 
i-1 i-n+1 
Public benefit, Z, is a function of the whole rural road 
system, both public and private. The functional form of z^' 
and Z is strictly increasing in all arguments, smooth, and 
quasi-concave. Rural residents can enjoy the public benefit 
without diminishing anyone else's consumption and this is a 
direct function of the entire road system--the road i 
provides (unless ieB^, then q^-0), the core system, and the 
system everyone else provides. The main idea embodied in the 
form of (7) is that the public benefit is from a system 
effect and the system is composed of Q and C. 
Z, the functional form is general enough to allow a 
change in the private system to have a different effect on 
the public benefit than a change in the public system. If a 
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change in Q or C had the same effect on the public benefit 
then a simpler form for Z could be used and would be Z-Z(Q+C) 
or Z-Z(S). In an effort to maintain generality, the more 
flexible form is kept throughout the analysis. 
Person i is assumed to be facing a budget constraint of 
the following form: 
(8) li - yi + pSqi + t^ isB 
The private good is being defined such that one unit costs 
$1, therefore py equals one. p9 is the price for q^ and I^ 
is the endowed wealth or income for person i. Each person is 
required to pay a proportion of the cost of C, the public 
road system, in the form of a tax, t^. The sum of all the 
t^'s (over the N people) will be the cost of providing C or 
pCC.33 
The government structure of the current model is simple 
with only one government providing a public good, the county. 
The tax structure is simple and in the form of a lumpsum. An 
interesting extension of this work would be to include the 
state and federal government levels. The tax structure could 
then be expanded and used to investigate optimal provision 
levels for the state and federal governments. Once another 
government is included in the model, issues such as multi-
be + 
^^For the people in set , the budget constraint would 
t^. 
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jurisdictional private and public activities similar to the 
analysis published by Sandler and Culyer could be 
incorporated into the model, 
The amount of q, if any, each person provides is assumed 
to come from an economic decision-making process involving 
utility maximization. If a Nash-Cournot perspective is 
assumed, each person will maximize their utility over y and q 
taking everything else as exogenous, thus person i thinks 
that the amount of q^ he or she provides will not affect Q'i. 
The utility function in equation (2) can also be represented 
as a function of y^, q^, Q"^, and C by substituting in for 
and Z which allows utility to be a function of purchased 
goods--y the private good and q the amount of road provided: 
(9) ui(yi,xi,Z) - U^-(y i , aq^ , Z ( q^+Q " ^  , C ) ) 
Note that from equation (9), a useful relationship can 
be easily seen, a relationship which relates benefit space to 
purchased-good space. A relationship between q space and x,Z 
space can be obtained by taking the partial derivative of 
utility with respect to q^ and similarly for y^, then 
dividing through by the equation involving y^: 
S^sandler and Culyer, 707-716, 
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(10) U q a u 
+ ieB 
or 
(11) MRsJy aMRS ieB 
Where Uq denotes the partial derivative of U with 
respect to q, Uy the partial derivative of U with respect to 
y, etc. This notational convention will be used throughout 
this chapter. MRSqy is the Marginal Rate of Substitution of 
q for y, as denoted in the usual way. Equation (11) shows 
that the Marginal Rate of Substitution of q for y is a 
weighted sum of the MRS of x for y and the MRS of Z for y. 
The Nash-Cournot problem for a representative individual 
i, using equations (8) and (9), can be formally represented 
as follows : 
Nash-Cournot Solution 
(12) Max _ U^(y^,aq^,Z(q^+Q"^,C)) ieB 
Subject to I^ > y^+ p^q^+ t^ 
y^> 0, q^> 0 
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or in Lagrangian form 
(13) L - U(yl,aqi,Z(ql+Q'i,C)) + A(I^ - - p^q^ - t^) 
Person i is maximizing utility by choosing y^ and q^ subject 
to y^ and q^ being non-negative and that purchases are less 
than or equal to wealth. 
The core system, C, is not part of the individual's 
choice set because the level of C is determined through a 
political decision-making process which leaves it exogenous 
to each individual. Chapter V looks more closely at the 
determination of C and the individual's reaction to a change 
in C . 
The tax, t^, is also exogenous to person i. The sum of 
all the t^'s will equal the cost of providing C or p'^C which 
is not determined by the individual. Through a comparative 
static analysis, a change in C and t^ is investigated. 
First order, Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a maximum imply 
the following relationships for person i^^: 
. . . aL 
(14) yl; Uy - A < 0 , y^ > 0 , y^ - 0 
ayi 
(15) qi: aU^ + Z Uj - Ap^ < 0 , q^ > 0 , q^ 7=0 
* ^ ^  aql 
^^Alpha C. Chiang, Fundamental Methods of Mathematical 
Economics. 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), 722-729. 
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(16) A: -t^>0, A>0, A — =0 
d X  
For choice variable y^, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
dictate that three relations will hold, one is that y^ is 
non-negative which is a repeat of the constraint.^® Another 
is the first derivative of L with respect to y^ is less than 
or equal to zero. The third is that the product of y^ and 
dh/dy^ is equal to zero. These conditions allow for the 
possibility of the choice variable being zero. Similar 
conditions hold for the choice variable q^. The conditions 
in (14)-(16) will determine whether q^ will be positive and 
if so, what value will be optimal. 
The relationship in (16) will hold with equality for all 
i because, with nonsatiation, all wealth will be spent. Thus 
(17) - y^ - p9qi - t^- 0 and A > 0 V ieB . 
People from set B will also choose a positive quantity 
of yi.37 The private good, y, is a normal good and will be 
^^Note that is notation for dU^/dy^ and similarly 
for and U^. V 
X Z 
^^The people who are members of will also choose a 
positive quantity of the private good and spend all of their 
income. 
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consumed in positive quantities by all. Therefore the first 
order conditions can be simplified to the following: 
(18) Uy - A - 0 , yl > 0 V ieB 
Interpretation of (15) will depend on the preferences. 
One person from B may provide a positive quantity of q 
because of his or her preference ordering while another may 
close their road to the public and thus q^—0, If q^ is 
positive, (15) simplifies to 
(19) aU^ + ZqUg - Ap9 , qi > 0 ieB . 
Individual i will consume a positive quantity of q as 
the benefits received from q are great enough to warrant a 
positive level of q. Conversely, if individual i does not 
consume a positive quantity of q, then (15) becomes^^ 
(20) aU^ + ZqUg :S Ap^ , q^ - 0 isB . 
Or by dividing (14) into (20), the following result is 
seen : 
^®The members of set B^ will also choose a zero quantity 
of q^ and (20) will also hold for ieB^. 
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U U 
(21) P iGB 
U U 
For this person, the weighted sum of the MRS between x and y 
and the MRS between Z and y is less than the price and 
therefore he or she will not provide any q. The price of q 
discourages provision because the benefits gained are not 
great enough. 
If the local government desired the road, q, to be open 
to the public under private provision, part of the cost of 
providing the road would have to be subsidized. Positive 
provision levels would have to be induced. Another policy 
the Board of Supervisors might pursue and which warrants 
further research would be to allow the individual to provide 
the road but in some form subsidize part of the provision 
costs. The model that Bergstrom, et al. developed allowed 
for such partial government provision of the public good.^^ 
Information on the private provision costs versus the 
public costs is needed to determine if this is economically 
feasible from the public's viewpoint. At issue is whether an 
individual can maintain a road with enough increased 
efficiency, that the government could pay an incentive to the 
individual to keep the road open and still derive a benefit. 
^^Bergstrom et al., 25-49. Steinberg, 415-431, also 
incorporated partial government provision in his model. 
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Now going back to a person i, who at the utility maximum 
equilibrium, consumes a positive quantity of q, i.e., follows 
(19). This person will set his or her marginal rate of 
substitution between q and y equal to the price of providing 
q. To see this relationship divide the first relationship in 
(15) by the first in (14) and use the relationship in (10) or 
(11). Specifically 
(22) MRS^ - aMRS^ + Z.MRS^ - pQ ieB . qy xy Q Zy 
A weighted sum of the benefits derived from x and Z is 
being equated to the price of providing q where the weights a 
and ZQ are the change in the benefits x and Z as q is varied. 
If a is greater than ZQ then relatively more private benefit 
is produced from a unit of q and the marginal rate of 
substitution between x and y is given the higher weight. 
The private benefit is likely to have the greater weight and 
may be what ensures that a positive quantity will be 
provided. 
From the perspective of the policy makers, knowing that 
if a road is turned over to an individual, the road will 
continue to be provided would be important information. If 
they want the road to remain open to the public, then the 
structure of the demand for q would be important. Further 
empirical work could try to estimate the demand function for 
q. The reduced-form equations can be derived, using the 
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Implicit Function Theorem and restricting the Hessian 
determinant of the first order conditions to be positive-
definite. Specific demands could also be estimated by 
assuming a specific functional form for the utility function 
or by imposing a structure on the demands. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for sufficiency will be 
fulfilled because the utility function is an increasing, 
smooth, quasi-concave function and the constraint is linear 
(which assures the constraint qualification is met). All of 
the relationships which were substituted into the utility 
function were strictly increasing and quasi-concave which 
does not alter the functional form of the utility function. 
A full explanation of sufficient and necessary conditions for 
a maximum can be found in Chiang^®. 
Nash-Cournot Comparative Static Analysis 
A comparative static analysis is conducted for those 
individuals who demand positive quantities of q. The 
analysis, if done the usual way by totally differentiating 
the first order conditions and then solving for dq^/dQ"^ or 
dqi/dC using Cramer's rule, produce a formidable equation 
which does not have a straightforward interpretation. 
^®Chiang, 738-743 and for the quasi-concavity results, 
744-746. 
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However, by approaching the comparative static analysis 
differently, the results become more easily interpreted. 
By first deriving the following results, the comparative 
statics which follow are more conclusive. The utility 
function, U^(y^,x^,Z), for individual i evaluated at the 
equilibrium values can be represented as follows: 
(23) ui(yi*,xi*,Z*) - U^* - 0 
Where the * notation signifies that y, x, Z, and U are at 
their Nash-Cournot equilibrium value. Equation (23) can be 
written as an implicit function: 
(24) F(yi*,xi*,Z*,ui*) - 0 
Using the Implicit Function Theorem^l, a function f can 
be found such that 
(25) y^* - f(x^*,Z*, U^*) 
The partial derivatives of f have a specific relationship to 
F, by using the Implicit Function Rule the following holds 
41chiang, 204-214, 
^^The assumption underlying the use of the Implicit 
Function Theorem and Rule is that Fy is nonzero which is 
valid if in the equilibrium neighborhood, an increase in y 
will yield a change in utility which holds since the utility 
function is strictly increasing in all arguments. 
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(26) ay 
I x  
i* 
T W  z*,ui* 
ui 
X 
y 
and 
(27) dy 
a z "  
i* 
xi*,ui* F,1 
u 
"y 
Equation (26) shows that for this constant utility level, the 
change in ywhen x^* changes (with Z* and U^* fixed) is the 
negative of the marginal rate of substitution between x and 
y. The same relationship holds for Z. 
Now define -yi* as a function whose arguments are 
x^*, Z*, and U^* then equations (26) and (27) can be re­
written as 
( 2 8 )  ay 
i* 
ax r* z*,ui* 
- (xl*,Z*,ul*) 
- MRS 
xy 
and 
(29) ay  
i* 
az '  xi*,ui* 
- (xl*,Z*,ul*) 
- MRS 
Zy 
The matrix of second derivatives of (28) and (29) with 
utility unchanged is of interest: 
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(30) 
H -
-»L <z 
-«L -«Iz 
ieB 
Because utility is quasi-concave in all arguments, y 
is convex in x^* and Z* along a locus of constant utility 
which implies the signs of the determinants of H are 
both nonnegative or H is positive semi-definite. This result 
will be useful later. A further assumption is made that the 
determinants are nonzero which is the same assumption 
referred to in the previous discussion of estimating demand 
equations. 
The comparative static analysis can now be continued. 
The first interesting comparative static result from (13) is 
the change in the equilibrium supply of q^ when Q"^ is 
varied. How will the representative individual respond if a 
change occurs in the exogenous private system? The total 
differential of (22), using the relationship from (28) and 
(29) is as follows: 
43where Hi - [-M^ ]. 
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(31) dpi - + 2aM^zZQ+ Zq 
+ ZQ (aM^ z + ZqMlz)dq-i 
+ Zc(*"xz + Vzz""= 
+ (*«1, + ZqMiy)dn ieB 
The change in q as Q"^ changes, with price and the core 
system, C, held fixed is of the following form: 
(32) dq' (*"xz + Vzz' + (<u + Vzu' 
dQ -i 
dU 
dQ -1 
Where is a quadratic form 
(33) 
- [a ZQ] ":x 
"Zx 
- "xZ 
-  »ZZ 
a 
Z, > 0 
The middle term is identical to (30) and was found to be 
positive semi-definite (and assumed to be positive definite) 
which ensures that the quadratic form, W^, will be positive 
definite, providing the coefficients a and ZQ are both 
positive, which they are by assumption. 
Equation (32) is a Slutsky-type equation, broken into 
the substitution and income effect. The substitution effect, 
the first term, will depend on the sign of the term in 
50 
parentheses because ZQ and are both positive. The term 
M^z is negative or the marginal rate of substitution between 
Z and y is decreasing. The sign then depends on the 
magnitude of M^z (the change in the MRS^y as Z is varied), 
which can not be determined a priori. Whether x and Z are q-
substitutes or q-complements determines the sign^^. If 
is negative or a q-substitute, then as Z is increased, at the 
margin x is less valuable. 
But a reasonable argument can be made for x and Z being 
q-complements. As Z increases, i.e., the public benefits 
derived from the road system increase, which implies that the 
general level of the system aspect of the road network is 
improving. For example, assume person i has experienced an 
improvement in emergency vehicle service and suppose x^, the 
private benefit, is an increase in market value of i's 
property. As the system becomes "better", x will increase. 
If the complementarity is large enough (aM^z > ZqMzz), 
the substitution effect could be positive. However a large 
complementary relationship is unlikely which could leave the 
substitution term negative. The second term in (32) is an 
income-type effect and will be positive as long as x and Z 
are normal goods, i.e., as the equilibrium level of utility 
J. R. Hicks, A Revision of Demand Theory (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), 156 or for an excellent 
summary see Cornes and Sandler, "Easy Riders, Joint 
Production, and Public Goods," 580-598. 
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increases, with Z held fixed, x becomes more valuable or vice 
versa. 
The income effect pushes the whole relationship in the 
positive direction. If the substitution effect is slightly 
negative then the income effect will likely offset the 
negative and leave the whole term positive. If x and Z are 
strong complements and both are normal goods, the Nash 
reaction path would have an upward slope (dq/dQ*^ > 0). 
These results have policy implications because if one 
person or even several people increase their provision of 
roads either autonomously or through a one-time inducement, 
the remaining rural residents may follow along. Thus the 
government could improve the private system through an 
inducement paid to a few individuals. 
The next comparative static result investigates a change 
in the core system provided by the county. The form is very 
similar to (32): 
(34) dq 
dC 
i 
dC 
dU i 
In fact (34) and (32) differ only by the term Z Q in (34) 
versus ZQ in (32). By the same arguments used in the 
previous comparative static analysis, the substitution term 
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may be slightly negative. The coefficient on dU/dC will be 
positive, given the normality assumption described before. 
At first glance, one might think that dU/dC is positive, 
i.e., as the core is improved, utility will increase. This 
may not be the case as is shown next. 
To look closer at what happens to utility as the 
exogenously determined C is allowed to change, the utility 
function with the substituted budget constraint in place of y 
can be used. But before that is shown, the tax relationship 
is useful to remember: 
N 
(35) ^ ti - p°C 
i-1 
The sum of the taxes paid by everyone in the county 
exactly covers the cost of providing the core network of 
roads. A simplification is to assume that everyone pays the 
same tax, which reduces the generality of the results very 
little but does add an additional constraint to the structure 
of the model. The relationship under this assumption is as 
follows : 
(36) Nt - p°C 
Everyone pays the same tax and person i's share will be 
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(p^/N)C. Notice that since t is the same for all, the i 
superscript was dropped. 
The utility function with the substituted income 
constraint (also using the relationship in (35)) is of the 
following form: 
(37) - U^(I^'- p9qi_ ^  C, aqi, Z ( q'•+Q " , C ) ) 
N 
Now, as C is varied, the change in utility (holding q^, I^, 
N, and Q"^ fixed) is as follows: 
i i PG i 
(38) dU - (Z.U? - U^)dC V i C Z y 
or 
dU^ i P i 
(39) - Z Uj - __ V i 
dc ^ ^  N y 
A change in the exogenously determined core has an 
interesting and ambiguous effect on utility. If the level of 
the core is such that the public benefits have a large effect 
on utility, then dU/dC will likely be positive. But if the 
marginal utility of Z, the public benefit, is small relative 
to the marginal utility of the private good y then dU/dC will 
be less than zero. But if N is large, the likelihood of 
dU/dC being negative falls. If there are many people to 
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share the tax burden, then a change in the core will likely 
have a positive effect on utility. 
Thus the sign of (34) is slightly more ambiguous than 
(32) due to the taxes that have to be paid for the core 
system. An increase in the core may or may not result in a 
change in q depending on the complementarity of x and Z and 
also depending on the change in utility due to a change in C 
More deterministic results would require more structure in 
the model via specific functional forms. The comparative 
static analysis for C can be investigated further through th 
effect of a change in t. Using the relationship in (36), th 
total differential is 
1 
(40) dC - (tdN + Ndt - Cdp ) 
By substituting for dC in equation (31) and again holding 
Q'i, p9, pC and N constant, the comparative static equation 
for a change in t is found: 
(41) ^ (*HxZ+ + (*"xU ^q"zU^ dU 
dt p° dt 
The interpretation of the substitution term, when 
compared to the initial analysis of C, does not differ other 
than it is now multiplied by a positive value, N/p^, which 
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increases the magnitude of the minus if there is weak 
complementarity. 
If the complementarity between x and Z is weak and the 
substitution term is negative, then dq^/dt is ambiguous, 
depending on the sign of dU/dt. The whole term becomes 
unambiguously negative if dU/dt <0, an increase in the tax 
will have a negative effect on utility. The sign of this can 
be investigated with a procedure similar to that used 
previously on dU/dC. 
The following equation comes from using equation (39) 
and the relationship dC-(N/pG)dt: 
dU B 
(42) _ - _ Z,., -
Thus dU/dt will be positive if the marginal utility from 
consuming another unit of y is less than the marginal utility 
from consuming another unit of the public benefit, Z, 
weighted by NZq/p*^. This is likely to be the case which 
implies that equation (38) may be positive, given the 
assumption of weak complementarity between x and Z. Again N 
becomes important, if N is large then the tax is spread over 
many rural residents and the increase in the core will 
increase utility, even though each resident must pay a higher 
tax. 
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If the county increases the tax due to an increase in 
the core system, the level of q person i provides may 
increase. Given the structure of the model, an individual 
may provide more q as the core is increased even though the 
tax must be paid. 
The Nash-Cournot model provides several conclusions 
about the behavior of an individual, the conclusions can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Members of the set who have no opportunity to 
provide a private road, obviously provide no q. They do 
however pay taxes to support the core. 
2) Members of B will provide a positive quantity of q, if 
the weighted sum of the Marginal Rate of Substitution 
between x and y and the Marginal Rate of Substitution 
between Z and y is greater than the price of q. 
3) The reaction to a change in Q"^, the rest of the 
private system, is likely to be a positive change in the 
private road provided because the income effect will 
overshadow the slightly negative substitution effect given 
the assumption of weak complementarity between x and Z. 
4) The reaction, through a change in the provision of q, 
to a change in the core may be a positive change in road 
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provided even though a tax must be paid to support the 
core system. 
5) To achieve deterministic results more structure would 
have to be introduced into the model via more specific 
functional forms. 
Pareto-optimal Solution 
The maximizing q for the individual who is following Nash 
behavior may not be the "best" amount of q when taking 
society's perspective. Because of the partial publicness of 
q, these additional benefits are not likely to be considered 
by the individual. Pareto-optimal criteria search for an 
equilibrium where no one can be made better off without 
someone else experiencing a decline in utility.^5 Pareto 
criteria are used as a social decision rule to ask whether 
the q^ being provided by person i, under Nash-Cournot 
behavior, is optimal from society's perspective. 
The Pareto-optimization problem is set up as a 
maximization of person I's utility subject to everyone else 
obtaining a given utility level, U°J, as well as the 
aggregate income/consumption transformation function. Person 
1, who is a member of set B, is used rather than i because 
^^For example see Cornes and Sandler, The Theory of 
Externalities. Public Goods, and Club Goods. 15-18. 
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the indexing is more understandable. Also for notational 
convenience, assume that the N people in the rural area have 
been arbitrarily numbered from 1 to n for those with the 
opportunity to provide private roads and n+1 to N for those 
who do not. The utility maximization is structured as 
follows : 
(43) Max Ul(yl, aql, Z(ql + , C)) 
{y',q',C) 
Subject to 
N N 
^ ih a ^ (yh + pSgh + p^C) 
h—1 h—1 
Uj(yj, aqj , Z(qj + Q'J , C)) & U°j j-2 N 
y' > 0, q' & 0, C > 0 
Note that Q"J - Q - qj for all j and if j is from then 
Q"^ - Q. Also y' and q' are vectors containing y^,y^ y^ 
and ql,q2 q" respectively. A linear transformation 
function is assumed which implies constant costs. The sum of 
the I's over all N people represents the exogenously-fixed 
level of resources. 
Equation (44) presents the Lagrangian for this problem: 
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N 
(44) L - Ul(.) + A{ ^  (I^ - yh - p^qh - p°C)) 
h-1 
N 
+ ^ Uj(.) - UOj ] 
j-2 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions from (43) can be represented 
as follows : 
(45) < A and 
k k y a 0, y* --- - 0 
ayk 
N 
(46) 7^(aU^ + ZqUk) + ^ 
j-1 
k k ^ ^ q a 0, q* --- - 0 
aqk 
N 
(47) ^ < Ap° and 
j-1 
d L  
C  >  0 ,  C -0 7-1 
dc 
k-1,...,N; 7^- 1 
T^ZqU^ < Ap9 and 
k—1,...,N; 7^ — 1 
In (45), all k people will consume some of the private 
good, so the marginal conditions will hold and y^ will not 
equal zero. The conditions in (46) will differ depending on 
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if keB (and if so whether k chooses to consume positive q) or 
whether keB^. 
For some individuals in B, a positive quantity of q will 
be provided and the marginal conditions will hold with 
equality (i.e., q^ > 0 for some keB). Let the first m people 
in B desire a positive amount of q and the remaining people 
in B be indexed from m+1 to n. The people indexed from m+1 
to n will desire q^-0. For agents who are indexed from n+1 
to N (by definition these are from set B*^) , the quantity of q 
consumed will be zero and the marginal conditions may not 
hold with equality. 
The amount of core desired by the public will likely be 
a positive quantity, a road network of some size will be 
needed. If so, the. marginal conditions in (47) will also 
hold with equality. 
Combining (45) and (46) gives a relationship for the m 
people providing q which is comparable to the Nash solution: 
(48) 4. "Z H. V "Z 
j-1 
y y y k-i r jMk 
Or 
N 
(49) aHES^y + Zq MRsJ^ + } Z„ 
J-1 
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By comparing (22) and (49), one can see that, for those 
providing q, the amount provided under the Nash solution will 
be less than the Pareto-optimum. The sum of the benefits 
derived by everyone else is not being taken into account in 
the Nash solution. If q^ is adding to a system of roads 
which benefits others besides i, this additional public 
benefit is not being considered by i. Although person i does 
consider his or her public benefit coming from the provision 
of qi. 
The condition in (49) shows that the sum of everyone's 
marginal rate of substitution between the public benefit and 
private good should be considered when deciding from 
society's perspective whether the road should be provided. 
If this sum plus the private benefit is not greater than the 
price, then q will be zero and these are the m+1 to n 
individuals who provide no public road--these are roads which 
should be abandoned. 
The road should be provided if the benefits society 
receives from the road plus the private benefit the 
individual receives is greater than the price of providing 
the road. Roads that do not meet this criteria are the ones 
which should be abandoned or left as private driveways. 
These are the roads that have low benefits compared to costs 
of provision. The empirical analysis in the following 
chapter investigates whether such a set of roads exists. 
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Notice that if no private benefit existed, the amount of 
q provided, under the Nash-Cournot behavior, would be less 
and much further from the Pareto-optimum. The existence of 
the private benefits may have the effect of moving the 
individual equilibrium consumption levels closer to the 
Pareto- optimum. 
To further compare the Nash-Cournot provision levels to 
the Pareto-optimum, two levels of comparison are needed. The 
first is the comparison between equations (22) and (49). 
This showed that the desired Pareto-optimum provision is 
slightly larger than the Nash-Cournot, larger by the benefits 
the rest of society gains from the road. This sum is 
probably not large because the roads chosen to go into the 
private system, Q, are little-used roads. 
The second level of comparison, while not as direct, is 
important. This comparison is the number of people providing 
roads under the Nash-Cournot versus the number who should be 
providing using Pareto criteria. Is the motivation strong 
enough, assuming Nash-Cournot behavior, to induce the optimal 
number of members in B to provide a positive q? If so, how 
does the number of people compare to the number that should 
be providing using Pareto-optimal criteria? These are 
questions which should be addressed in future research. 
The optimal provision of C is seen by dividing equation 
(47) by (45): 
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N 
(50) ]  ZCMRSGY -  PC 
3-1 
The core system, C is a pure public good and the condition in 
(50) is very close to the familiar Samuelsonian condition 
where for a Pareto-optimum, the public good should be 
provided such that the sum of everyone's Marginal Rate of 
Substitution between the public and private good should be 
equated to the Marginal Rate of Transformation between the 
private and public good. Here the weighted sum of the MRS 
between the public benefit and the private good is equated to 
the price ratio (note pY-l) which is equal to the Marginal 
Rate of Transformation due to the assumed linear 
transformation function. 
Conclusions from the Pareto-optimal analysis can be 
summarized as follows; 
1) The first order conditions for those individuals in B 
who provide a positive quantity of q were found to dictate 
higher provision levels than those in the Nash-Cournot 
solution. 
2) The Nash solution did not take into account the sum of 
the public benefits derived from everyone else which can 
be seen through the Pareto-optimal solution. 
3) A comparison of the number of optimal providers (q^>0, 
leB) under Pareto versus Nash behavior can not be made 
without further research. 
4) If the optimal amount of q is zero, then the benefits 
to society of having the road are less than the cost and 
the road should be abandoned. 
5) The existence of the private benefit, x, will likely 
move the Nash solution closer to the Pareto-optimal 
solution. 
6) The optimal level of the core is where the sum of 
everyone's Marginal Rate of Substitution between C and y 
equals the price ratio. 
The results from the theoretical analysis suggest a 
compound policy for addressing the road and bridge problem. 
The marginal, low-volume roads with little nonlocal traffic 
should be identified. These marginal roads should then be 
further evaluated as to whether abandonment is feasible. 
If abandonment does not make sense, then returning the 
road to private ownership should be considered. If the 
benefits to the individual are greater than the cost, the 
road will be privately provided. However, if the individual 
benefits are small relative to cost, the individual will not 
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provide the public road. If the road is of the latter type, 
possibly a subsidy should be paid to induce the individual to 
keep the road open. 
The next chapter presents a benefit-cost analysis which 
attempts to investigate whether a set of roads presently 
exists that could be abandoned in an Iowa study area. This 
benefit-cost analysis tries to estimate whether the 
abandonment is a Pareto improvement. The roads which the 
analysis attempts to identify are the roads in the Pareto 
model where q equals zero. These roads have a negative value 
to society because the benefits are less than the cost of 
providing the road, even if the individual is allowed to 
provide the road. First the model for the benefit-cost 
ratios is explained and then estimation procedures and 
results of the analysis are reported. 
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CHAPTER IV. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is a well known tool which 
can be used as a guide in choosing between two or more 
proposed policies or projects. BCA is a method which can be 
used for estimating society's preferences for such items as 
rural roads. The preferences and "dispreferences" are 
reduced to one overall figure which purports to give the net 
benefits to costs ratio from society's perspective. 
The underlying assumption of BCA is that a decision­
maker or ethical observer has some objective function which 
is to maximize society's net benefits. So to use BCA in the 
rural road framework is to assume that one decision-maker 
exists who wants to maximize net social gain. The political 
process is ignored under this a s s u m p t i o n . ^ 6  
Specifically BCA is used to evaluate the existence of a 
set of roads which can be abandoned with a resulting Pareto 
improvement in a 10 mile square study area located in north-
central Iowa. A map which shows an outline of Iowa and the 
study area, located in Hamilton county is presented in Figure 
For a discussion of translating between BCA and 
economic theory see Ajit K. Dasgupta and D. W. Pearce, Cost-
Benefit Analysis: Theory and Practice (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1972), 11-25. 
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1. The issue of downsizing the public road system through a 
mixed strategy of abandoning some low-volume roads and 
returning other roads to private ownership is investigated. 
The roads returned to private ownership are not available to 
the public, i.e., closed to the public via a gate or sign. 
The previous chapter allowed the individual to keep the 
road open to the public, which is not the case for the 
empirical analysis. The private drive scenario was included 
in the empirical analysis because of current interest is such 
a strategy. Rather than obliterating a road after public 
abandonment, the road is returned to the rural resident 
having access on the road and the road becomes part of the 
resident's driveway. Thus the road is no longer open to the 
public and is now private property. 
The study area is not highly populated, with a mix of 
farm and nonfarm rural residents. Relative to other Iowa 
counties, Hamilton county is relatively "well off" for an 
Iowa county. It has a high tax base due to the productivity 
of the area. The agriculture is grain producing with very 
few livestock operations. The road system is well developed 
with a good system of paved farm-to-market roads. In the 
study area and a three-mile wide border surrounding the study 
area, there were 57.5 miles of paved roads, 142.2 miles of 
gravel surfaces, and 2 miles of earth surfaced roads. The 
study area included one small, incorporated town. 
Mason Ci 
Hamilton 
County Sioux City 
Dubuque E Ft.Dodge Waterlco 
Ames Cedar Rapids 
_ Eettendorf 
Iowa Cityf Des Moines 
Burlington 
Figure 1. Iowa map with study area 
locations 
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Total societal benefits gained from keeping a road open 
to the public are defined as the additional travel costs 
incurred by the traveling public when a road or group of 
roads is removed from the public system. The traveling 
public incurs additional travel costs if roads are abandoned 
or returned to private ownership because some traffic must 
now travel longer to reach an intended destination or travel 
on lower-quality road surfaces. To reiterate, the benefit to 
society for having a group of roads available for public 
travel is the additional travel cost the public would incur 
if the set of roads was unavailable for travel. 
The cost of providing the road includes the savings in 
variable and fixed road maintenance costs, road resurfacing 
and reconstruction costs as'well as bridge maintenance costs 
on the abandoned roads less the variable maintenance, 
resurfacing and reconstruction costs transferred to the roads 
inheriting the traffic from the abandoned roads. The costs 
also include the rental value foregone by having the land in 
roads rather than in production,^7 less the cost of 
converting the land from road to agricultural use. 
^^Note that the opportunity cost of agricultural land 
being used for roads may actually be zero or negative. With 
the current surpluses in many feedgrains, having additional 
land come back into production may have a negative social 
value. 
70 
Specific Form of Benefit-Cost Ratios 
The following is the representation of the model used 
for the benefit-cost ratio to evaluate whether a road or a 
group of roads should remain in the county road system versus 
being totally abandoned: 
(51) (B/C)J - [ (TCr.i - TCj.) ] * [ (MCj. - MC^.i) 
+ (RECp — RECj..2_) + (RESj. — RES^-i) 
- (VLf.i + ROWr) ]'^ 
where : 
A (B/C)j. - the abandonment benefit-cost ratio of the 
rth road. 
TCj. - total vehicle transportation cost if the r 
road is maintained. 
TCr_i - total vehicle transportation costs if the r*-^ 
road is abandoned. 
MCj. - total maintenance cost before the rth road is 
abandoned, 
- total maintenance cost after the r^^ road is 
abandoned. 
RECj. - the discounted present value of roadbed 
reconstruction costs before the r^^ road is 
abandoned. 
RECr-i - the discounted present value of roadbed 
reconstruction costs after the r^^ road is abandoned. 
RESj. - the discounted present value of resurfacing 
costs before the r^^ road is abandoned. 
RESr-i - the discounted present value of resurfacing 
costs after the r^^ road is abandoned. 
VL^-i - value of land if the rroad is abandoned. 
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ROWj. — the discounted present value of the cost of 
converting the right-of-way of the r^^ road to 
agricultural production. 
If the value of the ratio in equation (51) is less than one, 
the net benefits to society of keeping the r^^ road in the 
system is less than the cost of providing the road. 
The following benefit-cost ratio was used to evaluate 
whether a road or group of roads should be converted to 
private drives (A private drive is still maintained as a road 
but is no longer open to the public and the maintenance is 
paid for by the private users of the road): 
(52) (B/C)J^ 
where : 
(B/C)j" - the private drive benefit-cost ratio of the 
j r o a d .  
TCj — total vehicle transportation cost if the j 
road is not converted to a private drive. 
TCj.i — total vehicle transportation costs if the j th 
road is converted to a private drive (the traffic 
generated by the owners of the private drive is still 
allowed to travel on the j road). 
MCj - total maintenance cost before the jth road is 
converted. 
MCj_i - total maintenance cost after the jroad is 
converted. 
MCpD — maintenance cost for private drive j. 
- [ (TCj.i - TCj) ] 
+ MCpjj) + (RECj — 
+ RECpp) 1 
* (MCj — MCj_2 + 
RECj-i) + (RESj — RESj_2 
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RECj - the discounted present value of roadbed 
reconstruction costs before the j road is 
converted. 
RECj.i - the discounted present value of roadbed 
reconstruction costs after the j road is converted. 
RESj - the discounted present value of resurfacing 
costs before the jroad is converted to a private 
drive. 
RESj_i - the discounted present value of resurfacing 
costs after the jroad is converted. 
RECpD - the discounted present value of 
reconstruction cost for private drive j. 
Again, if the value of B/C^^ is less than one, the cost to 
the public for providing the road is greater than the 
benefits to the traveling public (society). 
Empirical Estimation of the Benefits 
The road system in the Hamilton county study area was 
coded into a computer dataset using a network representation. 
An additional three mile border surrounding the study area 
was also included in the network. In network analysis 
terminology, a node is where a trip originates, destinâtes, 
or is relayed. An arc connects two nodes and is what the • 
trip flows over. 
Each intersection of the study area road network was 
given a node number and a node was also placed at every 1/2 
mile of road. Bridges were represented by 1/4 mile arcs. 
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Since each node had a number, the origin and destination of a 
trip could be represented by using the appropriate node 
number. 
Each arc, say arc^j, which connects node i to node j, 
was coded with the distance from i to j. Cities and tracts 
of land which usually have multiple accesses were each given 
one node number and this node was connected with zero 
distance to all arcs entering the city or tract. Such a 
methodology allowed the computer to chose the "best" entrance 
to the city or tract. 
Travel information for the study area was obtained by 
surveying the residents in the study area. Two types of 
questionnaires, one for the farmers and one for nonfarm 
residents, were developed. The questionnaires asked for 
detailed data on travel patterns, number of trips, and 
vehicle types. (An abbreviated form of the farm 
questionnaire was used for farmers who did not reside in the 
study area but did operate land within the area.) Copies of 
the farm and nonfarm questionnaires are included in the 
Appendix. The goal of the survey was to interview everyone 
who lived in or farmed land in the study area in 1982. The 
interviewing was conducted in 1983 but the travel data were 
for 1982 because the respondents were being asked for travel 
in the previous year. 
The farm interview response rate was 97.8 percent and 
the nonfarm rate was 93.6 percent which is a tribute to the 
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Iowa State Statistical Laboratory. The Statistical 
Laboratory, under contract, located the residents and 
conducted the personal interviews. One hundred seventy 
farmers were interviewed and 110 nonfarm residents were 
questioned. The incorporated town was sampled at a rate of 1 
per 11 residents. There were also 56 nonresident farmers who 
were interviewed^®. 
A partial outline of the information requested in the 
questionnaires is presented in Table 1. Information from the 
questionnaire was coded into data sets and analyzed so that 
the final data set had the origin and destination code of all 
the trips reported in the questionnaires. The vehicle used 
for each trip as well as the number of trips were also part 
of the final data set. 
A shortest-path algorithm (Dijkstra's algorithm) was 
computerized and used to route all the trips through the road 
network of the study area.49 The algorithm finds the least 
cost route from one node to all the other nodes and stores 
^^Further analysis of the questionnaire data is 
presented in Cathy A. Hamlett, Gregory R. Pautsch, and C. 
Phillip Baumel, Financing Local Infrastructure In 
Nonmetropolitan Areas. David L. Chicoine and Norman Walzer, 
Ed. (New York: Praeger Press, 1986), 93-108. 
For a detailed description of the computerized 
algorithm, see Gregory R. Pautsch, Cathy A. Hamlett, C. 
Phillip Baumel, "An Examination of a Local Road and Bridge 
System: A Network Model Approach," Transportation Models for 
Agricultural Products. Won K. Koo, Ed. (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1985), 81-104. 
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Table 1. Outline of information requested on the farm 
and nonfarm questionnaires 
I. Location of respondent's home and, if a farmer, 
location of land tracts. 
II. Number of acres in each tract of land. 
III. Access points to each tract. 
IV. Detailed information on deliveries made to each tract. 
A. Number of deliveries. 
B. Location of dealer and vehicle type making 
deliveries. 
V. Specific information on farm pickup travel. 
A. Tract to tract travel. 
B. Off farm travel. 
VI. Detailed tract to tract travel (in addition to pickup 
travel). 
A. Vehicle used. 
B. Number of times vehicle entered each tract. 
VII. Number and size of combines, tractors, and trucks. 
VIII. Information on intra-farm and off-farm product 
hauling. 
A. Product hauled and number of trips. 
B. Origin and destination of trip. 
IX. Personal travel information. 
A. Number of trips. 
B. Vehicle used and destination of trip. 
X. Deliveries made to each house. 
A. Location of dealer. 
B. Frequency of deliveries. 
XI. Other traffic coming on to homestead. 
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one mile on 
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traveling 
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e type and 
were from 
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vehicle type, for example the value used for the automobile 
was a weighted sum of the value for recreational driving and 
work-related travel. Cost functions were estimated for over 
50 types of vehicles, including farm and nonfarm vehicles.50 
The main assumptions implicit in this method of 
estimation are as follows: 
1) Travel costs are a linear function of distance traveled 
for each vehicle type. 
all intermediate minimum cost routes. The shortes 
assumed to be the lowest in cost, not necessarily 
shortest distance because, for example, traveling 
pavement costs less than traveling one on gravel, 
variable operating costs per mile for the vehicles 
over the network were estimated for paved, gravel 
surface roads. The variable costs included fuel, 
maintenance and travel time. These costs were ass 
a linear function of miles traveled on each surfac 
were based on 1982 prices because the travel data 
1982. The value of time spent on the road varied 
The cost per mile estimates and method of estimation 
is presented in Steven D. Hansen, Cathy A. Hamlett, Gregory 
R. Pautsch and C. Phillip Baumel, "Vehicle Travel Costs on 
Paved, Granular and Earth Surfaced County Roads," Proceedings 
- 26^^ Annual Meeting Transportation Research Forum. 26, No. 
1 (Nov. 1985). 
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2) The number of trips from a given origin and destination 
by each vehicle type is independent of changes in the road 
system (e.g., if a road is abandoned, people still shop in 
the same location). 
3) Vehicle purchase decisions are not affected by the 
relatively small changes in distance between an origin and 
destination due to a change in the road system. 
4) Travel routes are selected to minimize travel costs. 
5) Vehicles with gross weight greater than the rated load 
limit of a bridge are not allowed to cross that bridge. 
The steps for estimation of the benefit to the traveling 
public due to keeping a road or group of roads in the system 
were as follows: 
1) The computerized algorithm was run to route all the 
trips through the study area. 
2) The total miles traveled and cost of this travel was 
summed. 
3) The computerized road network was then altered by 
removing an arc or a set of arcs. 
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4) The same traffic in 1 was then routed through the 
"adjusted network". 
5) The total miles traveled and cost of the travel on the 
"adjusted" network was summed. 
6) The change in the travel cost, which is the estimated 
benefit, was then calculated. 
The benefit estimation for converting a road to a 
private drive is much the same as that described above for 
abandonment. The main difference is that the traffic was 
separated into the trips made by the general public and the 
trips made by people on the private drive. The general 
public trips were routed through a network which had the 
private drives removed and the private drive people used a 
network which still had the private drives. 
Empirical Estimation of the Costs 
The cost portion of the benefit-cost ratio is the annual 
cost savings over keeping the abandoned or private drive 
roads in the public system. These annual costs include the 
fixed maintenance expense associated with time and weather; 
variable maintenance cost less the additional maintenance 
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costs transferred to the remaining road system by the 
rerouted traffic; the annualized resurfacing and 
reconstruction costs; and the opportunity cost of keeping the 
land in roads. 
The basic assumption underlying the maintenance cost of 
a paved road is that a portion of the cost varies directly 
with the number of standardized--18 kip--axle loads passing 
on the road. (A kip is a standardized 18,000 pound load on 
each axle.) Each type of pavement is designed to withstand a 
projected number of 18-klp loadings during its expected life. 
An increase in the number of axle loadings in the form of 
more trips or heavier vehicles will Increase the maintenance 
cost of the road surface. Variable maintenance costs were 
estimated by equation (53). 
(53) VMC - (AVMC)(D)(TK/AK) 
where : 
VMC - variable maintenance cost. 
AVMC — average annual maintenance cost per mile of 
road. 
D - length in miles of a particular road. 
TK - total number of standardized (18 kip) axle 
loadings applied by the 1982 traffic. 
AK - average annual standardized (18 kip) axle 
loadings embodied in the pavement. 
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Equation (53) is used to adjust the average annual 
maintenance per mile of road due to changes in the number of 
trips as well as the size and weight of the vehicular 
traffic. 
The average annual maintenance cost per mile for the 
gravel and dirt surfaced road was assumed to be a linear 
function of the average daily traffic (ADT) on the road. 
Thus the total maintenance cost was obtained for the gravel 
and dirt surfaces by adding the fixed portion of maintenance 
to the variable part and multiplying by the distance of the 
road. The relationships used for the dirt and gravel surface 
maintenance cost are presented in Table 2. The investment 
strategy which involved converting roads to private drives 
required that maintenance costs for maintaining private 
drives be estimated. These costs were estimated by locating 
several farmers and rural residents who were already 
providing their own private road. They were asked to 
estimate their costs for maintenance and these averages are 
presented in Table 3. 
The periodic reconstruction and resurfacing costs of a 
road were annualized over the life of such investments. 
Table 4 presents the reconstruction costs used for the three 
types of surface. The opportunity cost of keeping the land 
in roads rather than in an alternative use was assumed to be 
the annual rental value of nearby land in agricultural 
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Table 2. Maintenance cost relationships used for gravel 
and dirt surfaces based on average daily 
traffic (ADT) 
Surface Maintenance Cost 
Dirt Z - $2026 + 1.52(ADT) 
Gravel Z - $2370 + 4,70(ADT) 
Table 3. Maintenance cost relationships used for private 
drive provision 
Cost per mile 
Type of Private Road per year 
Residence $1,437 
Small to medium size 
farm with household 1,509 
Large farm with household 2,382 
Field access only 410 
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Table 4. Reconstruction costs for dirt, gravel, and paved 
surfaced roads based on average daily traffic 
(ADT) 
ADT group Surface Reconstruction costs 
0-25 Gravel/Dirt Y - $7824 
26-100 Gravel/Dirt Y - $7824 + 122.00(ADT) 
100-399 Gravel 
Paved 
Y -
Y -
$12,399 
$58,141 
+ 73.18(ADT) 
400-1499 Paved Y - $10,605 + 118.84(ADT) 
1500 + Paved Y - $98,577 + 26,24(ADT) 
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production minus the annualized cost of converting the right 
of way to agricultural production. 
Two Estimated Benefit-Cost Ratios 
The mixed strategy was conducted in two parts, first 
under the abandonment scenario, 17.75 miles of low-volume 
roads were abandoned from the study area network. All but 
one of the sections of road had less than 20 vehicles per day 
travel, with 29 miles having fewer than 10 vehicles per day. 
The roads abandoned were not needed by anyone for either land 
or house access. Figure 2 contains a map of the Hamilton 
county study area and shows the roads that were abandoned. 
The second step was a private drive scenario which 
involved removing more roads from the study area network, due 
to private drive conversions. A total of 40 miles was 
converted to private drives. The private drive scenario was 
cumulative with the abandonment. This means that the 
abandoned roads were left out of the network for the private 
drive scenario. Figure 2 also shows roads converted to 
private drives. 
^ A complete description of this entire procedure is 
published in Baumel et al., 130-147. Also note that the 
opportunity cost for not having land in agricultural 
production was assumed to be positive. 
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••• HI—Roads examined for abandonment 
17.75 miles; 5 bridges 
H2—Roads examined for conversion to private drives 
40.0 miles; 9 bridges 
Figure 2. Map of Hamilton county study 
area with abandoned roads and 
private drives 
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As stated before the before - abandonment or private drive 
conversion solution was run, the network altered, and then 
the after abandonment and conversion solution was found. 
Table 5 contains a percent breakdown for the absolute mileage 
and cost increases for the different travel groupings after 
abandonment and then after private drive conversion. The 
farm traffic had approximately 30% of the miles traveled yet 
had over 40% of the cost which indicates that, as would be 
expected, the farmers have a significant portion of rural 
travel costs. 
The denominator of the benefit-cost ratio is broken into 
several components which are presented in Table 6. The 
changes in savings to the county under the abandonment and 
private drive solution are reported. 
A summary of the benefits and costs of the two 
strategies is displayed in Table 7 which shows that the 
benefit-cost ratio for the abandonment strategy was 0.71. 
Thus the traveling public incurs a cost of $0.71 for every 
$1.00 that the county saves. This indicates clearly that the 
possibility of abandoning some low volume roads exists. The 
private drive benefit-cost ratio is even more favorable at 
0.37. The county could save $1.00 for every $0.37 in cost to 
the traveling public. 
What the BCA indicates is good evidence that reducing 
the size of some rural road networks would benefit society. 
A set of roads does exist that can be abandoned to the public 
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Table 5. Percentage cost and mile breakdown by major travel 
type groupings for abandonment and private drive 
investment strategies in Hamilton County 
Travel Group 
Households 
Farm 
School 
Post Office 
Total Miles 
Total Cost 
Abandonment 
Percent of total 
Miles Cost 
68.93 53.37 
29.12 42.15 
0.90 1.24 
1.05 3.24 
6,280,773 
$1,818,015 
Private Drive 
Percent of total 
Miles Cost 
68.69 53.15 
29.22 42.07 
0.97 1.34 
1.12 3.44 
6,448,786 
$1,878, 762 
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Table 6. Breakdown of the net savings to the county under 
the abandonment and private drive investment 
scenarios 
Abandonment Private drive 
County savings 
Road cost savings $ 73,300 $202,008 
Bridge cost savings 22,738 38,876 
Total $96,038 $240,884 
Private - drive costs 
Private road costs 76,212 
Private bridge costs 6,334 
Total $82,546 
Net total savings 
to county $96 ,038 $158 ,338 
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Table 7. Benefit-cost ratios for the abandonment and private 
drive investment strategies in Hamilton County 
Abandonment Private drives 
$68,521 $ 58,538 
96,038 158,338 
0.71 0.37 
Change in: 
Benefits 
Costs 
B/C ratio 
1) Miles of road -17.75 
2) Number of bridges -5 
-40 . 5 
-9 
with a resulting Pareto improvement to society's w e l f a r e .^2 
The private drive scenario seems to be particularly 
appealing. One decision-maker in a nonpolitical position 
would be likely implement one or both of these scenarios. 
The reality is that the decision-makers are political 
appointees and may view the world from a perspective 
different than an ethical observer, which Chapter V will 
discuss further. 
The next chapter will investigate the policy and 
political aspects of implementing such a strategy of 
returning public roads to private ownership. The final 
chapter presents the summary and conclusions of the research 
S^This particular investment strategy as well as others 
not reported here will also be published in Cathy A. Hamlett 
Gregory R. Pautsch, and C. Phillip Baumel, "Economics of 
Reducing the Size of the Local Rural Road System," 
Transportation Research Record (Washington, D.C.: 
Transportation Research Board, National Academy of Sciences, 
waiting publication). 
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CHAPTER V. POLICY ISSUES AND RELATED TOPICS 
The political structure surrounding decisions about 
downsizing the rural road network through conversion to 
private roads is investigated in this chapter. As in Chapter 
III, the private road is open to the public but provided 
privately. How rural residents may respond to policies 
related to private provision of rural roads is analyzed and 
discussed. 
Political Background and Processes 
A political process determines the road network size and 
the level of maintenance of any given road. This research 
considers the political process to be the election of the 
County Board of Supervisors and the resulting decisions by 
the Board. Each Supervisor is an elected official and along 
with the other supervisors makes decisions on allocation of 
tax dollars among services provided by the county. Rural 
roads are not the only good being supplied by the county and 
Board of Supervisors thus the tax dollars must be allocated 
among several uses. 
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These dollars come from property taxes, state - allocated 
monies and federal support. Currently, the budget set of the 
typical midwestern county is shrinking. The tax base for 
property taxes is declining due to the falling value of rural 
land and the federal government is decreasing its support. 
When the Supervisors are deciding how to allocate funds, 
a certain amount of constraint is placed on their decision­
making due to local, state, and federal mandate. There are 
certain services which must be funded to comply with the law. 
The Supervisors are the suppliers of the public good and 
one can assume they gain utility from their political office. 
As a result, the Supervisor wishes to be re-elected.53 The 
supervisor is a "political entrepreneur", so to speak, who 
strives to maximize the likelihood of being re-elected. 
Decisions about policy will be at least partially tempered by 
the possible damage to a re-election bid. Socially optimal 
economic policies may be different than the support-
maximizing choices. In the context of the County Supervisor 
election, the value of the marginal vote is very high, some 
Supervisors in Iowa have been elected by as little as a five 
vote margin. Thus, to the Supervisor, each vote is 
important. 
S^Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracv. (New 
York; Harper and Row, 1957) developed this view rather 
forcefully. 
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Rational voters use the level of welfare experienced 
under the incumbent government as an indicator of future 
performance. The incumbent's re-election bid will depend on 
previous performance and the politician will act to increase 
welfare by the end of his or her term. Policies will be 
approved even if, in the long run, after the election, the 
policy will generate a substantial welfare loss.^^ 
When confronted with a policy to convert roads to 
private ownership, the Supervisors will not likely be in 
favor of such action. Some of the electorate would 
experience a definite loss in welfare and the voters affected 
have incentive to inform the politicians of their 
displeasure. The amount of such incentive is demonstrated in 
the second part of this chapter. 
Clarence Stone wrote that the public official actually 
operates under a dual pressure system, one set based on the 
electoral accountability and the other based in the 
hierarchical distribution of economic, organizational, and 
S^They also show that as full information is available 
to all voters as well as to the politicians, the political 
choice will become the optimal choice. This suggests a 
testable hypothesis relative to the road and bridge problem. 
As the information from research about downsizing the rural 
road system is made available to the public, will the 
politicians make decisions which are more socially optimal? 
See Alex Cukierman and Allan H. Meltzer, "A Positive Theory 
of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of Democratic Government 
and the Benefits of a Constitution," Economic Inquiry. 24, 
No. 3 (July 1986), 369-388 for an excellent discussion. 
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cultural resources.55 Thus the Supervisor is on the one hand 
maximizing the number of votes obtained in the next election 
and on the other, attempting to satisfy the concerns of 
different groups of constituents. These two goals are 
conflicting only when a group of citizens wants a decision 
that will be perceived to adversely affect a large group of 
the voters. 
Examples of such groups with respect to the rural road 
system would be groups of neighbors living in the rural 
areas, farm organizational groups such as the Farm Bureau, 
business leaders within the community, and even friends of a 
member of the County Board of Supervisors. 
More on the Rural Residents 
The economic agents on the consumption side of the 
public good, in this case the rural roads, are divided into 
two groups. The first group (Set B) are the residents or 
farmers who live on or have a field access on a low-volume, 
marginal rural road which is a candidate to become part of 
the private road system. The second group (Set B*^) use the 
marginal roads to travel through the rural area but do not 
live on the marginal road. 
55ciarence N. Stone, "Systemic Power in Community 
Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory," 
American Political Science Review. 74, No. 4 (Dec. 1980), 984. 
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Each group's utility from the public benefit provided by 
the rural road network (both the core and the private system) 
depends on two aspects of the public good, the size of the 
network and the level of maintenance. This interaction can 
be taken into account by an index of road length/quality as 
was described in Chapter III. 
Group B tends to be small relative to group B"^, and may 
well form a "tightly knit" group. Rural residents who live 
on the low-volume roads could easily be of a similar social 
status and may all be farmers or belong to several of the 
same social organizations. The preferences are likely to be 
fairly homogeneous among the group B members. Group B could 
easily contain people who go to the same church or who belong 
to the same "social circle". Since the size of B is 
relatively small and the preferences are fairly homogeneous, 
organizing a joint effort of mutual interest would be easy 
and the participation level would likely be high. The joint 
interest would be, in this case, their roads and whether the 
roads are to remain in the core system. 
Group B® is less homogeneous than group B in terms of 
occupation, lifestyle, and wealth. Preferences relative to 
the marginal roads will probably be fairly heterogeneous. 
While some residents use the marginal roads only for Sunday 
drives or viewing colorful fall colors, others may use the 
roads for a short cut. An organization effort would not be 
as easily accomplished among the B^ group and free-riding 
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will be a much greater problem when compared to group B. The 
organizational effort will be more difficult both due to the 
size of and due to the heterogeneity of preferences. 
Policy Analysis 
A major question which arises when considering private 
provision of roads is, "why have some of these roads remained 
in the public system?" The group residents have more 
votes than group B, yet the actions of the County Supervisor 
seem to indicate that the preferences of group B are given 
more weight. (Note, however, that the Supervisors may 
genuinely feel that the transportation services are of very 
high value when compared to other publically provided 
services.) 
A proposed expansion of the core system of roads which 
is to be decided upon by the Board of Supervisors is 
investigated. The reaction being analyzed is not how the 
private road providers respond via a change in their 
provision of q but how they respond on a political level. 
The exogenously given C and the composition of B and B® is 
now of interest. 
The Supervisor, as described before, is very susceptible 
to boosterism on the part of the rural residents who would 
have to provide the private roads. Boosterism is a term 
which encompasses the political lobbying and other such 
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efforts on the part of a small group of residents to prevent 
or support a specific action by the local political governing 
body. Due to the high value of a marginal vote, a small 
group of citizens with intense preferences can have 
significant influence on decisions made by a Board of 
Supervisors. 
Example of Incentive for Boosterism 
Suppose the Country Board of Supervisors is considering 
a proposal to increase the core system of roads by some 
amount C"*" and will either accept or reject the proposal 
through a majority vote. For example, suppose the proposal 
is to add 40 miles of the private road system to the core set 
of roads. Let the probability of proposal C"*" passing be 
(or not passing I-tt^ .) . 
From the perspective of a member of set B, gains can be 
expected if the county takes over provision of his or her 
road. The 40 miles of road will affect a subset of B, 
denoted as b® and is the individuals who are presently 
providing the 40 miles. For example, assume 40 individuals 
are affected in this way by C"*" and their expected gain which 
is the expected savings from not providing a road minus the 
^^This proposal is chosen only for diversity and the 
results will be symmetric for a decrease in the core. 
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taxes paid when the set of roads is included in the core 
minus any lobbying costs is as follows: 
Where EG™ is the expected gain and LC™ is the lobbying costs 
incurred by person m, these are costs whether the proposal 
passes or not. Contrary to previous use of prices, both p*^  
and p9 are assumed to be equal to p. This assumption does 
not change the results but does simplify the notation. The 
assumption was that the 40 mile proposal affected 40 
individuals in B, therefore s—40. 
Let these 40 people be indexed from 1 to 40 and the 
remaining residents be indexed from 41 to N. If m can 
transfer the provision of his or her road to the public, 
instead of paying pq™ for the provision, the cost will be 
spread over the N people in the rural area, which is again 
assuming, that each person pays 1/N of the cost of the core 
system. 
Someone from the group or from the remainder of B has 
a different expected gain (actually loss) if C"*" passes: 
s 
s 
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If the proposal C"*" passes, the people who would be 
Indexed from 41 to N will pay 1/N of the cost of C"*" and any 
lobbying they do would be an additional cost. People who are 
already providing the private roads considered in C"*" 
obviously have a greater economic incentive to put resources 
into lobbying efforts to keep their roads in C or to add 
their roads to C. To illustrate this, consider a simple 
example such as N-20,000, *^-0.5, p-$1500 and the q™'s are 
distributed as follows: 
i) 30 at q"-0.5 
ii) 5 at q"-0.8 
iii) 5 at q^-l.0 
The total expected gain, exclusive of lobbying costs, 
for the 40 individuals in b® will be the sum of $11,223.00, 
$2,995.50, and $3,745,50 or a total of $17,964. The expected 
gain for the remaining 19,960 residents, which is actually an 
expected loss, is $-17,964, again exclusive of lobbying 
costs, or an expected cost of $0.90 per person. 
The group on each side of the issue, given the 0.5 
probability of passing, stands to gain or lose roughly half 
of the cost of adding the additional roads exclusive of any 
lobbying costs. Group b® will be in favor of C"*" and each 
member of the three q types (q°eb®) could spend $374.10, 
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$599.10, and $749.10 respectively in lobbying efforts to get 
C"^ passed and still expect to breakeven. The remaining rural 
residents will individually be willing to contribute up to 
$0.90 in a lobbying effort for preventing the passing of C"*". 
A valid question is if an expected gain of $0.90 minus 
lobbying costs will be enough to bring any action from the 
general rural resident. A "threshold of Interest" may well 
exist which is not reached at less than $0.90. The cost of 
participation may be high compared to the expected cost, the 
minimum lobbying cost could easily be greater than $0.90. 
These residents would have no incentive to gather information 
about the supervisor, lobby, or even to vote in the 
supervisor election. 
An organized effort by these members,' as discussed 
before, will be difficult. The members of b® on the other 
hand have a great deal to gain from the passage of C"*" and can 
afford to become very involved in lobbying efforts. Their 
efforts will be much easier to organize. 
Group b® can use several avenues for their lobbying, the 
most direct is when group b® people show up at the public 
meetings of the Board of Supervisors. Here the intimidation 
is at its greatest, for a shouting group of 40 people is a 
formidable force for a Supervisor who may have been elected 
by five votes. Media coverage is another avenue for applying 
pressure. Editorials in the local paper and local television 
coverage of meetings are two examples of this. 
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Group b® also has less direct means of applying 
pressure, they can contact people among the remaining rural 
residents who are now providing private roads but whose roads 
are not part of proposal C"*" and try to convince them that 
they should be on the side of group b® or at a minimum, stay 
neutral. 
This simple example shows why the private provision of 
roads may not have been a feasible political alternative. 
The group b®, while small, have great incentive to keep their 
roads in the public system. If a proposal arises that 
affects their road, they have incentive to become very 
involved. The structure of the incentive for the larger 
group (i€b®) is such that little or no incentive exists for 
participation. If they do want to participate, organizing a 
lobby effort is more difficult. No wonder the County Boards 
of Supervisors have passed few proposals to eliminate roads 
from the public system. 
Another consideration, not as yet addressed, is the size 
of s or the number of people affected by proposal C"*". The 
numerical example used 40 people which showed that the 
boosterism effort would likely win out over the effort of the 
larger group. But a valid question to ask is what if s-1, 
i.e. only one person is affected. Such a strategy may be the 
only way the Board of Supervisors will be able to achieve 
such road reduction measures. 
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By selecting one road at a time, the Board may have a 
better chance of passing the proposal and still be re­
elected. However, if the rural residents on the marginal 
roads recognize the strategy the supervisors are playing, the 
residents might pursue logrolling behavior.^7 All residents 
on marginal roads would vigorously oppose any proposal to 
remove a marginal road from the public system because the 
next road might be their own. Further research could use 
game theory to model the behavior of the residents and the 
Supervisors. 
S^Something like logrolling behavior is already being 
observed when a County Board of Supervisors proposes road 
abandonment. The opponents who attend the public meeting are 
much greater in number than are directly affected by the 
abandonment. People will show up who live on other marginal 
roads and who are friends of the people directly affected by 
the proposal. The lobbying group for the Iowa County 
Engineers Association has even been trying to submit a bill 
to the Iowa Legislature which prevents anyone from attending 
the public hearing not directly affected by the proposed 
abandonment. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The rural road and bridge problem is the lack of funds 
to upgrade and maintain the rapidly deteriorating rural 
transportation infrastructure. Much of the rural road 
system, particularly in the midwest, is built on a one-mile 
grid system which produces an extensive network of earth, 
gravel and paved surface roads. This system contains over 
2.2 million miles of roads of which 70 percent of the bridges 
were built prior to 1935 when traffic composition was much 
different. 
Local governments have felt the pressure of shrinking 
revenues and increasing obligations with respect to the road 
system for at least a decade. With the further decrease in 
the property tax base due to the decrease in land values, 
difficult decisions are looming in the not too distant 
future. Such decisions will likely involve downsizing the 
road system. 
The first part of the research investigated the private 
provision of rural roads. Even though present liability laws 
are prohibitive in this respect, the concept of private 
provision of public roads was analyzed. This may well be a 
partial answer to the public financing problems of the local 
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government--turn low volume, minimal access roads over to the 
individuals who have land bordering the road and let them 
provide the road. 
A theoretical model was used to model the individual 
behavior of rural residents if such a scenario happened. A 
utility-maximization model was used which incorporated the 
joint product aspect of a privately provided public road. 
The jointness comes from the private, public benefits that an 
individual experiences from providing a road. 
The private benefits are derived from such things as 
increased market value of property due to better property 
access or more convenient schoolbus pick up and delivery of 
children. The public benefits are generated from the system 
aspect which the private road enhances. Better emergency 
vehicle service or speedier postal delivery come from a good 
road system and these benefits are public, i.e., experienced 
by all. 
The jointness framework was used to look at equilibrium 
conditions of road provision if a representative individual 
solved a Nash-Cournot utility maximization strategy. The 
individual under this behavior considers the public road 
system and the private roads provided by other rural 
residents to be exogenous to the decision-making process. 
Using a Kuhn-Tucker framework, the equilibrium first 
order conditions were used to show that, from the 
individual's perspective, if a positive amount is to be 
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provided, the optimal provision is to set the marginal cost 
of the last unit of road provided equal to the weighted sum 
of the marginal rate of substitution between private benefit, 
private good and the marginal rate of substitution between 
public benefit, private good. If the marginal benefits are 
not greater than the price of provision, the road will not be 
provided and thus be closed to the public. 
A comparative static analysis was conducted on the Nash-
Cournot model. The effect on private road provision of a 
change in the exogenous private system provided by everyone 
else was investigated. Given the assumption that the private 
and public benefit have a weak complementarity, the income 
effect will likely move the sign of dq/dQ'^ in the positive 
direction which means that if the private road system 
exogenous to individual i is increased, i will respond with 
an increase in provision. 
A change in the public road system and the resultant 
change in taxes may also produce a positive change in the 
provision level of the private road. The comparative statics 
indicate that if the county increases the quantity and/or 
quality of the public system, the individual will likely 
follow by upgrading his or her road. More deterministic 
results from the comparative statics would require more 
structure imposed on the model. 
To investigate welfare implications, the road provision 
was analyzed using Pareto criteria. The Pareto-optimal level 
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of provision was derived and not surprisingly found to be• 
greater than that of the Nash-Cournot solution. What was 
interesting is that due to the jointness, i.e., the 
combination of private/public benefits, the two solutions may 
move together as the private benefit becomes relatively more 
important. 
The Pareto levels and the Nash levels differed because 
under Nash behavior the individual does not take into account 
the spillover public benefits derived from the rest of 
society. On the decision of whether to keep one's road open 
and if so at what level, by using Pareto-criteria, one should 
consider all other's marginal public benefits. 
A comparison between the optimal number of private road 
providers under Nash-Cournot versus Pareto-optimal can not be 
made with out further research. But the optimal number under 
Pareto criteria is probably greater than with Nash behavior 
because of the spillover public benefits from the privately-
provided road. 
The Pareto model predicted that some roads could be 
abandoned if the benefits to society of having the road were 
less than the cost of providing the road, even under private 
provision. The empirical analysis presented in Chapter IV 
attempted to identify a set of roads in an Iowa study area 
which could be abandoned with a Pareto improvement. 
A benefit-cost analysis was used to determine if 
society's net benefits due to a road remaining open to the 
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public were greater than costs of providing the road. Two 
investment strategies which are immediately feasible with the 
current laws in most states were investigated. Through the 
use of a computerized road network, several miles of low-
traffic roads were abandoned and others converted to private 
drives (where a private drive is closed to the public but 
available to individuals who own the road). An area in 
central Iowa was chosen as the focus and the residents of the 
10 mile-square area were asked for detailed information on 
their travel patterns. The data gathered, along with the 
computerized road network of the study area, were used to aid 
in the construction of a benefit-cost ratio comparing before 
road abandonment/private drive conversion to after 
conversion. 
The benefit-cost ratios were favorable to pursuing such 
a strategy of abandoning low volume roads and converting 
others to private drives. The cost to the traveling public 
(society) of such a scenario was less than the potential 
savings by the county (again the surrogate for society) from 
having their road network decreased. A conclusion from the 
analysis indicates the possibility of abandoning roads, with 
a net gain to society. One can also conclude that society 
would be better off if some roads were returned to private 
ownership. (Note, however, that the private drives in the 
benefit-cost analysis were not left open to the public. The 
converted roads essentially became long, private driveways.) 
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Returning roads to private ownership is an attractive 
alternative, mainly because the traffic on the marginal roads 
is usually generated by the people having access on the road. 
Once the road is a private drive, this traffic is still able 
to use the private drive. 
The final part of the research is an attempt to 
investigate the political implications of such policies. The 
decision of abandoning a road, converting a road to a private 
drive, or giving a road for private provision is made by a 
body of elected officials. These officials are susceptible 
to pressure from constituents and particularly from 
boosterism on the part of residents living on the roads being 
removed from the public system. Pressure exerted by these 
residents has likely been responsible for the limited number 
of roads abandoned or converted to private drives. 
A simple example is presented which illustrates how much 
economic incentive these rural residents have to fight the 
road conversion policies. When comparing the cost of 
providing a road by an individual and the cost spread over 
residents of an entire county little doubt is left as to why 
the residents practice boosterism. Due to the small group 
size and the homogeneity of preferences the effectiveness is 
likely to be very high. 
On the other side of the issue, while much greater in 
number and much more diverse, the remaining county residents 
stand to gain from a smaller public system, yet have a much, 
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much smaller economic incentive to become involved in 
lobbying efforts. 
Future Research Ideas 
Several areas of future research have been mentioned 
throughout the text. A summary of the possibilities for 
further work can be partitioned into seven areas: 
1) An extension of the private provision scenario would 
be useful. The research has so far focused on the polar 
case where the government provided a public system and the 
remaining roads were the total responsibility of the 
private sector. A mixed strategy where, for example, the 
government constructed the road and the private sector 
maintained it would be interesting to examine. 
2) Subsidization of private provision is also a 
possibility for further research. Possibly the government 
could subsidize the private provision of roads and still 
gain. In the same category, the government could tax the 
local users of a marginal road at a higher level than the 
rest of the public. 
3) Incorporation of a more sophisticated taxing structure 
into the Nash-Cournot and Pareto-optimal models would be 
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interesting. A balanced budget is being forced with the 
current model and everyone shares equally in the tax bill. 
A more realistic tax structure would be a useful 
modification. The model could be further expanded by 
including more than one level of government and then 
multi-jurisdictional issues could be investigated. Multi-
governmental levels would also allow an analysis of roads 
provided by the state versus the county and the joint-
product aspect of such activities could be considered. 
4) Empirical estimation of demand for roads could be 
conducted. Possible data sources would be people who 
already have private roads. Other empirical work could 
look at the relative weight between the private benefit 
and the public benefit of a road. Also in this same area, 
further work on the private road provision costs versus 
public provision costs would allow for better comparisons 
between private and public road provision. 
5) The optimal number of private road providers using 
Pareto-optimal criteria would be interesting to 
investigate, A comparison could then be made between the 
optimal number of Pareto-optimal providers and the number 
providing under the Nash-Cournot behavior. 
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6) Game theory could be used to model the behavior of the 
residents and the Board of Supervisors. A dominant 
strategy for each could be identified and an equilibrium 
predicted. 
7) Investigation of the effect information may have on 
the decisions of the Supervisors could be conducted with 
an empirical analysis. Do politician's decisions come 
closer to being optimal (versus political) when research 
information is available which supports the politically 
unpopular position? 
Ill 
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APPENDIX 
February 1983 
Form III 
NONFARM QUESTIONNAIRE 
Department of Economics 
and 
Statistical Laboratory 
Iowa State University 
Rural Road Use Study 
Household ID; Date 
CO. TWP. SEC. H.H. MO. DAY 
Start time 
Name of Respondent Interviewer ID # 
Iowa State University appreciates your help with this study. We 
will be asking for information about all travel for the members of this 
household. Your responses will be kept confidential and will be 
released as statistical summaries only. If a question seems unclear, 
let me know and I will try to clarify it. If you feel a question is too 
personal, you have the right to refuse to answer. 
I'd like to begin with some general information about your 
household. 
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1. In 1982, how many people were living in this household? Include college 
students who may be away temporarily, as well as anyone else who lives 
here and has no other home. 
2a. What is the first name of each household member? 
[ASK b AND c FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD MEMBER] 
b. What was age on his/her last birthday? 
(member) 
c. What is relationship to the head of the household? 
(member) 
a 
Household member 
b 
Age 
c 
Relationship 
— — 
3. How many of these people operated a motor vehicle? 
2 
a. 
Activity City/town 
a) to do their shopping 
b) to school (preschool) or to attend school 
functions. Do not include rides on the 
school bus. 
c) to attend church services or activities 
d) to attend social functions, visit friends 
and relatives or go for recreation 
e) to attend meetings 
f) to do banking or other family business 
g) to see a doctor or dentist 
h) to work 
i) to do any other activities not mentioned 
(specify what) 
Now we would like some information abouT: where household members go for various 
activities. We want the names of towns or cities, not the specific store, 
bank, etc. 
In 1982, generally where did your family go 
(activity) 
ENTER NAME OF 
EACH CITY OR TOWN 
[ENTER IN COLUMN a) BELOW THE NAME OF EACH TOWN OR CITY LISTED IN QUESTION 4 ASK QUESTIONS b THROUGH f FOR EACH CITY OR TOWN J 
Next we would like you to think about how frequently your family goes to each town or city. Please think of all 
household members as well as all the different reasons in order to determine how many total trips were taken. 
You may give your answer on a daily, weekly, monthly basis or as a total for the time period (season). 
Thinking of the winter season, how often did household members go to 
(city) 
[ENTER NUMBER AND CIRCLE FREQUENCY] 
During the spring season, how often did household members go to ? 
(city) 
During the summer season, how often did household members go to ? 
(city) 
During the fall season, how often did household members go to ? 
(city) 
[IF NO CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLD, SKIP (f)] 
When you go to , what percent of the trips taken are related to your children's activities such as school, 
(city) 
doctors, dentists and recreation and would not have been made otherwise? 
a b 
Winter 
c 
Spring 
d 
Summer 
e 
Fall 
f 
Percent City/Town 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
1. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
2. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
3. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
4. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
5. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
6. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
7. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
8. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
9. D W M SEA. D U M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
10. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
11. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
12. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. O W N  S E A .  D W M SEA. % 
5 
6. We are Interested In the types of vehll^ les household members used in 1982. 
These may be vehicles owned by others and used by household members for work 
(etc.) as well as your own vehicles. 
a. How many automobiles did household members drive to and from this place 
in 1982? 
b. How many pickup trucks did household members drive to and from this place 
in 1982? 
[HAND R THE BLUE CARD] 
c. Looking at the blue card, would you tell me, how many vehicles like these 
did household members drive to and from this place in 1982? 
[IF NONE, GO TO Q. 7] 
d. Still looking at the card, please give me the code numbers for each vehicle 
driven to and from this place in 1982. 
[ASK e FOR EACH VEHICLE] 
e. To what cities and towns was this vehicle driven? 
[ASK f FOR EACH TOWN] 
f. Thinking of all the trips household members made to . what percent 
(city/town) " 
of the time was this vehicle driven? 
d 
Vehicle 
e 
City/town 
f 
Percent of times 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
6 
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7a. [HAND R THE STUDY AREA MAP] 
Would you look at this map which shows a part of your county. Here is 
where your home Is located. I show that you live in township, 
section . Is that correct? (name) 
(number) 
_____ Yes 
No 
DK 
[MARK THIS LOCATION WITH A YELLOW MARKER] 
[HAND R THE RED PEN] 
c. Next we'd like you to show the place where you usually enter or 
leave a county road when traveling to and from your home. With this 
red pen would you mark a line on the map to show your usual access to 
your home from a county road. 
8a. In 1982, when household members traveled to the places we have just talked 
about, did they usually take the shortest route? 
Yes (Q. 9) 
No > Why not? 
[HAND R THE BLUE MARKER] 
b. We would like to know exactly which routes were taken when people were 
not taking the shortest route. Using this marker, please draw each 
route on the map. 
(IF NO TRUCKS IN Q. 6c, GO TO Q. 9] 
c. With what vehicle was this route taken? 
7 
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9. In this final section we would like you to think about the traffic 
which came onto your place. We'll first talk about deliveries made to you. 
a. In 1982, did you have any delivered? 
(product) 
[IF YES, ASK b AND c] 
b. From what town or city were deliveries made? 
[ASK c FOR EACH LOCATION1 
c. During 1982, how many times did you have delivered from ? 
(product) (city) 
[ENTER NUMBER AND CHECK FREQUENCY IN COLUMN c] 
Product 
a 
Deliv< pred? 
b 
Location of 
dealer 
c 
No. of 
times 
Da Wk Mo Yr 
Yes No 
Diesel fuel 
or gasoline 1 2 
LP gas (propane) 
or fuel oil 
1 2 
8 
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[HAND R THE ORANGE CARD] 
10a. Would you look at the orange card which lists products which may have been 
delivered to you. Thinking of any products like these, would you tell me, 
in 1982 did you have any of these kinds of deliveries made to your place? 
Yes 
No (Q. 11) 
b. What types of products were delivered? 
[LIST ALL IN COLUMN b AND ASK c AND d FOR EACH] 
c. From what town or city was the delivery made? 
(type) 
[ASK d FOR EACH LOCATION] 
d. During 1982, how many times did you have delivered from ? 
(type) (city) 
[ENTER NUMBER AND CHECK FREQUENCY IN COLUMN d] 
(b) 
Type of delivery 
(c) 
Location of 
dealer 
No. of 
times 
( 
Da 
i) 
Wk Mo Yr 
---- - - - -
— —  
-  — — -
----
----
----
lia. During 1982, did you have come to your place? 
(visitor) 
[IF YES, ASK b AND c] 
b. Generally, what city or town were these people coming from? 
[ASK c FOR EACH] 
c. During 1982, how many times did come to your place from ? 
(visitor) (city) 
[ENTER NUMBER AND CHECK FREQUENCY IN COLUMN c] 
Type of visitor 
a 
Have? 
b 
Where from? 
(city, town) 
No. of 
times 
c 
Da Wk Mo Yr Yes No 
Repairmen or workmen 1 2 
— —— 
Salespeople 1 2 
— — 
Guests or relatives 
or neighbors 
1 2 
— — 
Hired help such as a 
cleaning lady, baby­
sitters or yardmen 
1 2 
— — 
Any others? [Specify who] 
1 2 
10 
This completes our interview. Is there anytAf^ g else you would like to tell 
us about your travel? 
Iowa State University appreciates your help with this project. 
Ending time 
Total minutes of interview 
[INTERVIEWER COMPLETE THIS PORTION AFTER LEAVING RESPONDENT'S HOME] 
In general, how would you rate the reliability of the information given? 
1 » very reliable 
2 = generally reliable 
3 = not very reliable"^  Why? 
4 =• poor \ 
Was there anything about the respondent or interview setting which you feel affected 
the quality of the interview? 
No 
Yes > Explain 
. '-D 
. .  v . .  
V-
February 1983 \ 
' Form IV 
. FABM QUESTIONNAIRE 
Household ID: 
CO. 
Department of Economics 
and 
Statistical Laboratory 
Iowa State University 
Rural Road Use Study 
THP. SEC. H.H. 
Date 
MO. DAY 
Start time 
Name of Respondent Interviewer ID P N3 00 
Iowa State University appreciates your help with this study. We will be asking for information about 
all travel for the members of this household as well as all members of your farming operation. We are 
interested in road and vehicle usage. Your responses will be kept confidential and will be released as 
statistical summaries only. If a question seems unclear, let me know and I will try to clarify it. If you 
feel a question is too personal, you have a right to refuse to answer. Let's begin with some general 
information about your farming operation in 1982. 
[HAND R STUDY AREA MAP AND YELLOW MARKER. INDICATE TO R THE LOCATION OF HQMEBASE] 
Would you look at this map of a portion of your county. Here is the exact location of your home. Would you 
please draw the approximate boundaries of the land that makes up this home tract. 
[NUMBER THIS TRACT 1] 
In 1982, how many different tracts. Including your home tract, did you operate on your own, in partnership or 
in a corporation? 
' A TRACT IS A UNIT OF LAND SEPARATED BY A ROAD OR OTHER LAND NOT 
OPERATED. IF THE LAND IS ADJACENT OR NOT SEPARATED, THIS SHOULD 
BE ONE TRACT 
[IF ONE, GO TO Q. 4a] 
Now we would like you to Identify the other tracts you operated in 1982. Let's begin with the tracts that fall 
within the boundaries of this map. Please locate each of these tracts by drawing the approximate boundaries. 
[NUMBER EACH TRACT AND ENTER TRACT NUMBER IN COLUMN a IN THE TABLE. ASK b AND c FOR ALL TRACTS ON MAP] 
How many acres are in tract ? 
(number) 
How many access points do you have into tract 
(number) 
[HAND R THE RED PEN] 
With this red pen, would you place a line on the map indicating each access point (road,etc.) you have 
into tract . 
(number) 
[IF THE NUMBER OF TRACTS OUTLINED IS LESS THAN THE NUMBER IN Q. 2, GO TO Q. 6] 
That seems to account for all the tracts you operate, but just to double check, let me ask you, in 1982, 
did you operate any tracts which are not within the boundaries of this map? 
-
Yes 
_____ No ^^(Q. 8a) 
a b c 
Tract 
number No. of acres 
Number of 
access points 
1 acres 
acres 
acres 
acres 
acres 
acres 
acres 
acres 
acres 
acres 
5 
k 
6. Now we would like some information about each tract you operated which is outside the 
boundaries of this map. Would you put an X on the border of the map which represents 
approximately where each tract is located. 
[NUMBER CONSECUTIVELY EACH OF THESE TRACTS AND ENTER THE NUMBERS IN COLUMN a. ASK b THROUGH f FOR EACH] 
7a. I'd like to get some information about each of these tracts. Let's begin with tract . 
(number) 
b. In what county is this tract located? 
c. In what township is this tract located? 
d. What section is this tract in? 
e. Where in the section is the tract located? 
f. How many acres are in this tract? 
a 
Tract 
number 
b 
County 
c 
Township 
d 
Section 
number 
e 
Where in 
section 
[e.g. NE corner] 
f 
Number 
of 
acres 
any of the tracts we have talked about with another farmer (in partnership, 
[FOR OUR PURPOSES, A PARTNERSHIP IS AN INFORMAL OR FORMAL ARRANGEMENT 
i WHERE TWO OR MORE FARMERS SHARE THE WORK OR LABOR IN A FARMING 
[OPERATION 
What is the other farmer's name? 
Does live within the boundaries of this map? 
(name) 
Yes 
No (Q. 8e) 
Place an X on the map to indicate where he lives. 
[ON THE MAP, IDENTIFY THIS LOCATION AS "PARTNER" AND GO TO Q. 9] 
Could you give me the exact location of your partner's home. [PROBE FOR LEGAL DESCRIPTION OR DIRECTION] 
In 1982, did you operate 
corporation, etc.)? 
Yes 
No (Q. 9) 
6 
9. Now we would like you to think of the products that were either delivered to you or picked up by a 
member of your farming operation in 1982. We will only record information for products brought to 
tracts within the boundaries of the map. 
[ASK a FOR ALL PRODUCTS] 
a. In 1982 was brought co any of these tracts? [IF N'O, GO TO NEXT PRODUCT] 
(product) 
b. Did you usually take a full truck load? 
c. To which tracts was delivered? 
(product) 
d. During 1982, how many tiaes was 
HAMD 
R THE 
GREEN 
CARD 
delivered to tract 
(product) (number) 
e. Looking at the green card which lists various types of delivery vehicles, tell me the code 
number for the type of vehicle which usually delivered the ? 
(product) 
f. What is the name and location of the dealer who delivered the ? 
(product) 
PROBE FOR NUMBER OF 
TRIPS WITH DIFFERENT 
: VEHICLES OR TO 
i SEVERAL LOCATIONS 
w 
w 
Product 
a 
Delivered? 
b 
Full? 
c & d e 
Type of 
vehicle 
f 
Dealer & 
location Yes No Yes No 
Number 
Tract of 
no. times 
Number 
Tract of 
no. times 
Number 
Tract of 
no. times 
Number 
Tract of 
no. times 
Diesel fuel 
or gasoline 
1 2 1 2 
LP gas (propane) 
or fuel oil 
1 2 1 2 
Anhydrous 
ammonia or 
other liquid 
fertilizer 
1 2 1 2 
Dry fertilizer 1 2 1 2 
Herbicides/ 
Insecticides 1 2 1 2 
Seed, feed 1 2 1 2 
Livestock 
(Type?) 1 2 1 2 1— LO 4S 
Water 1 2 1 2 
Any other 
deliveries 
(Specify) 
1 2 1 2 
7 
8 
lOa. In 1982, did you take any equipment which was more than 16 feet wide on county roads? 
(Ex. a planter, combine, cultivator) 
Yes 
No (Q. 11a) 
b. What type of equipment was that? 
c. What was the width of this equipment when traveling on county roads? 
ft. wide ^ 
w 
Ln 
lia. Please think about all the vehicles and farm equipment that you or other members of your 
farming operation drove on the county roads in the study area. In 1982, did you ever take 
an alternate route ? 
(reason) 
[IF YES, ASK b AND c] 
b. With what equipment or vehicles did you take an alternate route ? 
(reason) 
c. We are going to call this route . Using this marker, would 
(letter from c) 
you draw the route you took ? 
(reason) 
[EŒPEAT a THROUGH c FOR ALL REASONS] 
HAND R 
THE BLUE 
MARKER 
AND 
MAP 
Reason 
a 
Ta] ce 
b 
What equipment 
c 
Route 
letter Yes No 
because of narrow bridges 1 2 A 
because of weight limits on bridges 1 2 B 
because of weight limits on roads 1 2 C 
because of dirt roads 1 2 D 
to avoid heavy traffic on roads I 2 E 
to use gravel roads with a tractor 1 2 F 
to avoid gravel roads with a car 1 2 G 
for any other reason 
1 2 H 
(Specify) 
w ON 
9 
10 
[HAND R THE WHITE CARD] 
Now we'd like you to think about the use of pickup trucks on your farm. Would you look at the white card 
which lists reasons a pickup might be used. Keeping these reasons in mind, we'd like you to think about 
how often you or other members of your farming operation traveled with a pickup on county roads to each 
tract you operated. 
[ASK a THROUGH e FOR EACH TRACT R OPERATES) 
In 1982, during the winter months, how often did someone go to tract with a pickup? 
(number) 
In 1982, during the spring months, how often did someone go to tract with a pickup? 
(number) 
In 1982, during the summer months, how often did someone go to tract with a pickup? 
(number) 
In 1982, during the fall months, how often did someone go to tract with a pickup? 
(number) 
When you traveled to tract , generally, which tract were you coming from? 
(number) 
a 
Winter 
b 
Spring 
c 
Summer 
d 
Fall 
e 
Tract 
number 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
From which 
tract? 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
' 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— — 
D W M SEA. D V M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
11 
12 
13. Still thinking about your pickup, now we'd like to know all of the places you traveled off the farm 
with this vehicle for farm business or activities. 
a. In 1982, to what cities, towns or locations did you or other members of your farming operation travel 
with a pickup to do farm business? 
[DO NOT INCLUDE HAULING PRODUCTS HERE - THEY WILL BE RECORDED LATER] 
[ASK b THROUGH e] 
b. In the winter months, how often did someone go to with a pickup to do farm business? 
(location) 
c. In the spring months, how often did someone go to with a pickup to do farm business? 
(location) 
d. In the summer months, how often did someone go to with a pickup to do farm business? 
(location) •-
w VD 
e. In the fall months, how often did someone go to with a pickup to do farm business? 
(location) 
f. Thinking of all the trips made with a pickup to , what percent were from tract 1? 
(location) 
[REPEAT FOR EACH CITY, TOWN, LOCATION] 
; a b 
Winter 
c 
Spring 
d 
Summer 
e 
Fall 
f 
Percent 
from 
tract 1 
City, town 
location 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W H SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D H M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
— 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D M M SEA. 
— — 
D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
13 
Ik 
14. [HAND R THE PINK CARD] 
Listed on the pink card are types of farm vehicles. We want to know about the use of vehicles like these 
on your farm. Would you think about all of the vehicles used for activities you engage In from spring 
tillage through fall field work. Do not Include grain hauling or the use of the pickups since we are 
recording those trips elsewhere. We will record trips with these vehicles to all tracts, but only want 
to consider trips if the vehicle traveled on county roads. 
[ASK FOR ALL VEHICLES] 
a. In 1982, was a used on your farm and driven on county roads? 
(vehicle type) 
[IF YES, ASK b THROUGH d] 
b. Where did this come from? 
(vehicle) 
[ASK c AND d FOR EACH TRACT VEHICLE CAME FROM] 
c. To which tracts did the go? 
(vehicle) 
[ASK FOR EACH ROUTE INDICATED IN b AND c] 
d. How many times was that trip taken? 
[REPEAT FOR EACH VEHICLE TYPE] 
Vehicle type 
a 
Use d 
b c 
Where from? Where to? 
d 
No. of 
times 
b c 
Where from? Where to? 
d 
No. of 
times 
b c 
Where from? Where to? 
d 
No. of 
times Yes No 
a tractor alone 1 2 
— •  •  "  " • —  '  - -  '  
a tractor pulling 
farm equipment 1 2 
- ' —— — • 
a pickup pulling 
farm equipment 1 2 
combines 1 2 
an automobile 1 2 
14
2 
any other vehicles 
Specify 
1 2 
15 
16 
15. Now I am going Co ask several questions about your farm machinery. 
On which tract or tracts la most of your farm machinery kept or stored? 
16. How many combines did you use in 1982? 
[IF NONE, GO TO Q. 17] 
a. Tell me the make and model of each combine? 
b. How many rows is the cornhead? 
c. What was the size of the beanhead? 
I-* 
W a 
Make & 
model 
b 
Cornhead 
c 
Beanhead 
rows ?
 
rows ft. 
rows ft. 
17. How many tractors did you use in 1982? 
[IF NONE, GO TO Q. 19] 
[FOR EACH TRACTOR, ASK 18a, 18b and 18cJ 
18. I'd like to ask some questions about each tractor you used. Let's begin with the largest tractor. 
a. What is the make and model of this tractor? 
b. What horsepower is this tractor? 
[ASK a FOR ALL, THEN ASK b AND c FOR EACH TRACTOR] 
c. Thinking of all the times someone took a tractor on county roads in 1982, what percent of the time was 
this tractor used? 
(a) 
Make & 
model 
(b) 
Horsepower 
(c) 
% of time used 
17 
18 
1'. . How many trucks did you or other members of your farming operation own in 1982? 
[IF NONE, GO TO Q. 24] 
I'C. How many of these were pickups? 
''1. How many of these were single-axle trucks other than a pickup? 
How many of these were tandem-axle trucks? 
Ul 
23. How many of these were semis? 
19 
24. 
HAND Rje. 
YELLOW i 
_CARD J 
Now we would like you to think about the products that were hauled from a tract to another location 
using county roads. This could include transporting from a field to on-farm storage, to the elevator. 
to market, as well as to any other location. Please include custom hauling, as well as hauling done by 
any other member of your farming operation. Include trips for products hauled in 1982 even if they were 
produced in another year. 
[ENTER TRACT NUMBER IN COLUMN BELOW AND ASK . . . J  
What products were hauled from tract 
Approximately how many loads of 
using county roads? 
(number) 
were hauled using county roads? 
LIST PRODUCTS IN COL. a, THENi 
ASK b THRU f FOR EACH PRODUCTi 
(product) 
Thinking of on-fana as well as off-farm locations, where was the 
How many loads did you take to 
(product) 
hauled? [ASK d THRU f FOR EACH LOCATION 
(location) 
Looking at the yellow card, which lists types of hauling vehicles, would you tell me the code number 
for the type of vehicle used to haul the to ? 
(product) (location) 
When hauling grain, what was the average number of bushels hauled per trip to ? 
•p-
a> 
(location) 
Tract 
number 
a 
Product 
hauled 
b 
Total no. 
of loads 
hauled 
c 
Where to? 
d 
No. of loads 
to location 
e 
Type of 
vehicle 
f 
Avg. bu. 
hauled 
147 
21 
25. In this section of the interview we would like some information about personal and 
family travel. First we will ask some questions about your household. 
In 1982, how many people were living in this household. Include college students who may 
be away temporarily as well as anyone else who lives here and has no other home. 
a. What is the first name of each household member? [ENTER IN COLUMN a] 
[ASK b AÎÎD c FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD MEMBER) 
b. What was age on his/her last birthday? 
(member) 
c. What is relationship to the head of the household? 
(member) 
a 
Household member 
b 
Age 
c 
Relationship 
22 
How many of these people operated a motor vehicle? 
Next we would like some information about where household members go for various 
activities. We want the names of towns or cities, not the specific store, 
bank, etc. 
In 1982, generally where did your family go 
(activity) 
ENTER NAME OF 
EACH CITY OR TOWN 
Activity City/town 
a) to do their shopping 
b) to school (preschool) or to attend school 
functions. Do not include rides on the 
school bus. 
c) to attend church services or activities 
d) to attend social functions, visit friends 
and relatives or go for recreation 
e) to attend meetings 
f) to do banking or other family business 
g) to see a doctor or dentist 
h) to work off the farm 
i) to do any other activities not mentioned 
(specify what) 
25 
21; 
TENTER IN column a) BELOW THE name of EACH TOWN OR CITY LISTED IN QUESTION 27) 
I_ASK QUESTIONS b THROUGH f FOR EACH CITY OR TOWN J 
28a. Next we would like you to think about how frequently your family goes to each town or city. Please think of all 
household members as well as all the different reasons in order to determine how many total trips were taken. 
You may give your answer on a daily, weekly, monthly basis or as a total for the time period (season). 
b. Thinking of the winter season, how often did household members go to ? 
(city) 
[ENTER NUMBER AND CIRCLE FREQUENCY] 
c. During the spring season, how often did household members go to ? 
(city) 
d. During the summer season, how often did household members go to ? 
(city) oî 
I— 
e. During the fall season, how often did household members go to ? 
(city) 
[IF NO CHILDREN IN HOUSEHOLD, SKIP (f)] 
f. When you go to , what percent of the trips you take are only to transport your children to and 
(city) 
from their activities such as school, doctors, dentists and recreation? 
a b 
Winter 
c 
Spring 
d 
Summer 
e 
Fall 
f 
Percent City/Town 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
No. of 
times Frequency 
1. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
2. O W N  S E A .  D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
3. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. 
4. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
5. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
i 
6. D W M SEA. D W M SEA.i D W M SEA. D W M SEA. (V N3 
! i 1 
7. D W H SEA.1 D W M SEA.i D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
i i 1 
8. D W M SEA. ! D W M SEA. i D W M SEA. \ D W M SEA. 
1 ! 1 
9. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
10. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
11. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
12. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. D W M SEA. % 
25 
26 
[HAND R THE ORANGE CARD] 
29a. Would you look at the orange card which lists products which may have been delivered to you. Thinking of any 
products like these, would you tell me, in 1982 did you have any of these kinds of deliveries made to your place? 
Yes 
No (0. 30) 
b. What types of products were delivered? 
[LIST ALL IN COLUMN b AND ASK c AND d FOR EACH) 
»— Ln 
c. From what town or city was the delivery made? ^ 
(type) 
[ASK d FOR EACH LOCATION] 
d. During 1982, how many times did you have delivered from ? 
(type) (city) 
[ENTER NUMBER AND CHECK FREQUENCY IN COLUMN d] 
(b) (c) (d) 
Location of No. of Da Wk Mo Yr 
Type of delivery dealer . times 
27 
28 
30. In this last section we'd like some information about people who came onto your place in 1982. 
a. During 1982, did you have come to your place? 
(visitor) 
[IF YES, ASK b, c AND d] 
b. To which tract did these usually come? 
(visitors) 
2. Generally, what city or town were these people coming from? 
[IF RESP. CANNOT GIVE CITY OR TOWN, PROBE FOR DIRECTION] 
r 1 d. During 1982, how many tines did come from to your place? ENTER NUMBER AND CHECK 
(visitor) (city) [FREQUENCY COLUMN 
i 
! Type of visitor 
i 
a 
Have? 
b 
Where to 
c 
Where from? 
(city, town) 
d 
No. of 
Yr Yes No (Tract no.) times Da Wk Mo 
1 
1 Repairmen or workmen 
! 
1 2 
• 
Salespeople 1 2 
—— 
1 II. 
Guests or relatives 
or neighbors 
Hired help such as a 
cleaning lady, baby­
sitters or yardmen 
1 
1 
2 
2 
Veterinarian or 
farm hands 
i 
i 2 
! ' 
Any others? [Specify who] 
1 2 
* — • 
29 
30 
We are interested in knowing what your plans are for the future. 
Do you expect to be farming here in ? 
(time period) 
[I? NO, ASK a FOR NEXT TIME PERIOD] 
Do you plan to change the size of your farming operation in ? [IF NO, GO TO NEXT TIME PERIOD) 
(time period) 
Would this change be an increase or a decrease? 
a 
Farming? 
b 
Change size? 
c 
How ch ange? 
Time period Yes No Yes No Inc. Dec. 
5 yrs. 
10 yrs. 
15 yrs. 
20 yrs. 
This completes our interview. Is there anything else you would like to tell us about your travel? 
Iowa State University appreciates your help with this project. 
Ending time 
Total minutes of interview 
[INTERVIEWER COMPLETE THIS PORTION AFTER LEAVING RESPONDENT'S HOME] 
In general, how would you rate the reliability of the information given? 
1 = very reliable 
2 = generally reliable 
3 = not very reliable"^ Why? 
4 = poor •J 
Was there anything about the respondent or interview setting which you feel affected 
the quality of the interview? 
No 
Yes > Explain 
51 
